177

KEEPING OUR EYES ON THE PRIZE: EXAMINING
MINNESOTA AS A MEANS FOR ASSURING ACHIEVEMENT
OF THE “TRIPLE AIM” UNDER THE ACA
Deborah R. Farringer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

177

II.

THE TRIPLE AIM AND THE ACA
184
A. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE TRIPLE AIM AND MANAGED CARE 186
B. DEVELOPMENT OF ACOS UNDER THE ACA
188

III.

CONSIDERING THE MAYO CLINIC AND ACOS UNDER
THE ACA
A. INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND ACO PARTICIPATION

191
192

IV.

CURRENT STATUS OF ACOS UNDER THE ACA?
202
A. ACO SUCCESSES
203
B. ACO CHALLENGES
207
C. DOES THE CURRENT ACO STRUCTURE FULFILL THE TRIPLE
AIM?
211
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
212

V.

CONCLUSION

223

“At the end of the day, if the only successful ACOs are those from
Geisinger, [Rochester, Minn.-based] Mayo Clinic and Kaiser Permanente,
what has society gained? These organizations were already operating at the
highest levels of confidence in respect to the triple aim.”
-Marc Bard, MD, ACOs: The Least Agreed-Upon Concept in
Healthcare? via Becker’s Hospital Review (May, 2013)
I. INTRODUCTION
A little more than four years after enactment of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”),1 daily headlines still abound on
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newspapers and websites across the country highlighting both successes and
failures of the ACA. Much of the public debate thus far has focused on those
aspects of the ACA that address insurance reform,2 such as the
constitutionality of the individual mandate,3 the launching of the healthcare
exchanges,4 and enrollment of previously uninsured individuals into new
insurance plans.5 While insurance reform is important and essential to
1
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 25
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.).
2
See Jean Card, Trust Your Gut on Obamacare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
(May 22, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/opinion-blog/2014/05/22/americansare-right-to-trust-their-gut-on-obamacare (stating “The Affordable Care Act was not
healthcare reform, it was health insurance reform. And why would anyone understand that,
when we generally don’t understand health insurance anyway?”).
3
While the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
“individual mandate,” which is that aspect of the ACA that requires individuals to purchase
health insurance or otherwise face a tax penalty, there continues to be litigation surrounding
this determination. See Sissel v. Dept. of Health and Human Srvs., 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (arguing that the ACA is unconstitutional because, to the extent that the
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance is actually a tax, the bill that eventually
became the ACA originated in the United States Senate in violation of the Origination Clause
of the Constitution, which requires that all bills for raising revenue originate in the United
States House of Representatives).
4
Paul Demko, More Than Half of Companies Considering Private Exchanges,
Survey Finds, MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 8, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20140707/BLOG/307079997 (finding that more than 50% of surveyed companies are
considering sending employees to private insurance exchanges, and 23% of employers are
likely to eliminate healthcare coverage altogether and instead direct their employees to the
public exchange); David Blumenthal, M.D., M.P.P. & Sara R. Collins, Ph.D., Health Care
Coverage under the Affordable Care Act—A Progress Report, NEW ENG. J. MED. (July 2,
2014), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/in-theliterature/2014/jul/1759_blumenthal_coverage_under_aca_progress_report_nejm_07_02_201
4_itl.pdf (estimating that twenty million individuals are now covered by insurance because of
provisions under the ACA, consisting of one million individuals between the ages of 19–26
who went on a parent’s policy, eight million individuals who purchased insurance off a federal
or state insurance exchange, five million individuals who purchased insurance directly from
an insurer, and six million individuals who enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP under expansion in
certain states).
5
There is debate as to whether the estimated eight million Americans who
enrolled in private health coverage under the ACA in the first year of enrollment are those
who were previously uninsured or those who opted for new insurance coverage on the
exchanges. See Amit Bhardwaj et al., Individual Market Enrollment: Updated View,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar., 2014), http://healthcare.mckinsey.com/individual-market-enrollmentupdated-view) (exhibit three shows that as of March 31, 2014, an estimated 27% of
respondents who purchased insurance on the health insurance exchange were previously
uninsured, up from an estimated 11% of respondents being previously uninsured); but see Liz
Hamel et al., Survey Of Non-Group Health Insurance Enrollees, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
(June 19, 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/report/survey-of-non-group-health-insuranceenrollees/ (finding that 57% of individuals who did not have group coverage who have
purchased insurance on a state or national insurance exchange under the ACA were uninsured
prior to purchasing their current plan). Irrespective of this dispute, about eight million
Americans purchased insurance coverage from either state or federal exchanges set up under
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understand (both as employers and for purposes of their own financial
statements), for providers, suppliers, and other participants in the healthcare
industry much of the dialogue and energy has been focused instead on those
aspects of the ACA that address other types of reform of the healthcare
system; specifically, the manner in which care is provided to patients and at
what cost such care is provided.6
In analyzing the stated goals of the ACA in its proposed reform of
the healthcare delivery system, many such goals have their origins in a
premise first proposed by Dr. Donald M. Berwick and the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement (“IHI”) in 2006 referred to as the “Triple Aim.”7
The Triple Aim is a framework for healthcare that, at its origin, was intended
to “optimize population health, care experience, and cost.”8 Much of the
impetus for this framework came about originally, and has managed to gain
traction since its origin, in response to the fact that the healthcare system in
the United States was then and continues to be today the most costly system
in the world.9 Yet, many patient outcomes and patient satisfaction scores in
the United States are nevertheless worse than in other developed nations.10
Thus, recognizing key challenges unique to the U.S. healthcare system,11 IHI
the ACA in the first year of enrollment. See Enrollment in the Health Insurance Marketplace
totals over 8 Million People, HHS.GOV (May 1, 2014) html [hereinafter HHS Press Release I],
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/05/20140501a.html.
6
See William M. Sage, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s Rear-View
Mirror, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2014).
7
See A History of IHI (“IHI”), INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT,
http://www.ihi.org/about/Documents/IHITimeline2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2015); see
also Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, And Cost, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS
759 (2008).
8
See Berwick, supra note 7.
9
Cathy Schoen, et al., Confronting Costs: Stabilizing U.S. Health Spending
While Moving Toward a High Performance Health Care System, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan.
10, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2013/jan/confronting
-costs; see National Healthcare Expenditure Projections, 2012–2022, CMS.GOV,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
10
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 759 (noting that despite spending the highest in
the world on healthcare expenses relative to other developed countries, the U.S. ranks 31st on
life expectancy, 36th on infant mortality, 28th on male healthy life expectancy, and 29th on
female life expectancy (citing World Health Organization, World Health Statistics of 2006)).
Note that some statistics have only worsened since the time of Berwick’s article. According to
the World Health Organization, World Health Statistics of 2014, the U.S. now ranks thirtyfifth in female life expectancy, thirty-fifth in male life expectancy, and thirty-second in overall
life expectancy. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2014 60–66,
available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/112738/1/9789240692671_eng.pdf?ua=1;
see also Karen Davis, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-report/2014/jun/1755
_davis_mirror_mirror_2014.pdf.
11
The findings of IHI regarding the need for the Triple Aim is based on the
assumption that the U.S. does not currently and will not under current reforms have a single
payor system. See Berwick, supra note 7 at 767 (“[W]ith some risk, we note that the simplest
way to establish many of these environmental conditions is a single-payer system, hiring
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established a framework that is intended to optimize health system
performance by focusing on the following three goals: (1) improving the
patient experience of care (including quality and satisfaction); (2) improving
the health of populations; and (3) reducing the per capita cost of healthcare.12
Utilizing knowledge of the perceived failures of the managed care movement
of the 1980s and 1990s,13 lawmakers and policy makers focused their
reforms on the concept of the “Triple Aim,” which appears different from
managed care reforms of the past because of its focus on achieving all three
of its stated goals simultaneously, only one of which is cost containment.14
While not specifically referenced as the “Triple Aim” in the actual
text of the ACA, the themes and goals of the Triple Aim were prominent
aspects of the dialogue and debate in both the U.S. Congress and at the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in connection with the
proposed reforms and process improvements under the ACA.15 For example,
the ACA initiated the formation of the CMS Innovation Center, which stated
goal is the “testing [of] various payment and service delivery models that
aim to achieve better care for patients, better health for our communities, and
lower costs through improvement for our healthcare system.”16 Probably the

integrators with prospective, global budgets to take care of the health needs of a defined
population, without permission to exclude any member of the population.”).
12
See The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT,
http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 28,
2014).
13
When health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) initially emerged in the
1980s, there was a proliferation of these types of organizations due in large part to the success
that was being demonstrated regarding cost containment. HMOs then fell out of favor by
the1990s, for various reasons, including concerns that insurers and providers sacrificed quality
of care in order to achieve cost containment goals. David Muhlestein et al., The Accountable
Care Paradigm: More than Just Managed Care 2.0, CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE
INTELLIGENCE 8 (2013) [hereinafter Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm], available
at http://leavittpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Accountable-Care-Paradigm.pdf.
14
Id.
15
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. §229b (2014) (stating
that entities who may be eligible for awards from the Center for Quality Improvement and
Patient Safety of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality will be judged by certain
criteria including the provision of better care at a lower cost); id. § 1315a (2014) (establishing
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation and stating that some of the testing models
will provide assistance to other healthcare institutions on how best to employ such best
practices and proven care methods to improve healthcare quality and lower costs). See also
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN AN ONLINE TOWN HALL ON
HEALTH CARE (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter OBAMA REMARKS], available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-online-town-hall-health-carereform.
16
See CMS Innovation Center, CMS.GOV http://www.innovation.cms.gov (last
visited Mar. 27, 2015). In addition to the CMS Innovation Center, the ACA proposed various
pilot programs and grant awards also with the goal of developing new systems that will
achieve the Triple Aim, such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program (to be discussed at
length in the remainder of this article), value-based purchasing programs, bundled payment
programs, patient-centered medical home models, etc. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (hospital
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most direct and obvious example in the ACA of a system process change that
is focused on achieving the goals of the Triple Aim and emulating integrated
delivery systems seemingly already achieving this balance is the formation
and creation of accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) under the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”).17 The ACA states that the MSSP is
intended to “promote[] accountability for a patient population and
coordinate[] items and services under [Medicare] parts A and B, and
encourage[] investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for
high quality and efficient service delivery.”18 Many scholars have praised
ACOs and ACO-like organizations19 as the best means for improving the
quality and efficiency of healthcare in a manner that fulfills the Triple Aim
because ACOs enable hospitals and physicians, as opposed to insurers, to
“join forces” and work together to better coordinate the care of patients in the
most cost effective and quality-driven manner.20
One of the most common examples of efficiency and quality utilized
during the debates leading up to enactment of the ACA was the worldrenowned Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.21 Promoted as a model of
the Triple Aim and exemplar for how ACOs should function, the Mayo
Clinic was frequently cited by President Barack Obama as one of the
institutions to which all other providers should look when considering reform
of the U.S. healthcare delivery system.22 The Mayo Clinic is ranked first on
value-based purchasing program); id. § 256a-1 (2014) (establishing community health teams
to support the patient-centered medical home.
17
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj; see also Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations
in the Affordable Care Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1372, 1374–75 (2012).
18
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
19
There are many organizations, sometimes referred to as clinically integrated
networks, that have been established since the enactment of the ACA or pre-dating the ACA
that have many of the same elements of an ACO, but do not meet the precise definition of an
ACO as established by the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHS”) in enactment
of regulations for the MSSP and thus are not participating in the MSSP. While many of the
arguments made in this article regarding ACOs apply equally to ACOs and clinically
integrated networks, this article will focus primarily on the structure that has been set up under
the ACA for establishment of ACOs under the MSSP.
20
See Pasquale, supra note 17 at 1374; Mark Morrell & Alex Krouse,
Accountability Partners: Legislated Collaboration for Health Reform, 11 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 225 (2014).
21
A search of the White House Press Office website reveals over 18 references to
instances in which the President or other White House officials mentioned the Mayo Clinic in
connection with healthcare or healthcare reform. See generally WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE,
http://search.whitehouse.gov/search/news?utf8=%E2%9C%93&sc=0&query=%22mayo+clini
c%22&locale=en&m=&channel=6&affiliate=wh&commit=Search (last visited July 10,
2014).
22
See OBAMA REMARKS, supra note 15 (“We have long known that some
places, including Minnesota, offer high-quality care at costs below average. (Applause) Look
at what the Mayo Clinic is able to do. It’s got the best quality and the lowest cost of just about
any system in the country. (Applause) So what we want to do is we want to help the whole
country learn from what Mayo is doing.”); Letter from President Obama to Chairmen Edward
M. Kennedy and Max Baucus (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/t
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the U.S. News and World Report Honor Roll for hospitals, and was listed as
one of the top three hospitals in the country for nearly all of the specialties in
which the publication ranks hospitals, including cancer; cardiology and heart
surgery; diabetes and endocrinology; ear, nose, and throat; gastroenterology
and GI surgery; geriatrics; gynecology; nephrology; neurology and
neurosurgery; orthopaedics; pulmonology; and urology.23 Even as a top
provider of healthcare in the nation (and, indeed, the world), the Mayo Clinic
has also been lauded as being able to provide high-quality care without
corresponding high spending.24
To determine whether these assumptions regarding the Mayo Clinic
and its role as a model for ACOs are true, it is necessary to examine the
structure and regulations established for ACOs. ACOs are considered one of
the primary means by which legislators and regulators intended for the U.S.
healthcare system to move towards the Triple Aim,25 or said another way,
look more like the Mayo Clinic. If the formation and adoption of ACOs is
intended to make other hospitals, physicians, and other providers resemble
those integrated systems promoted in 2009, and thus realize the Triple Aim,
it is critical that the ACO regulations create a structure that is accessible and
achievable for all types of providers across the delivery spectrum. As ACOs
begin in earnest, and industry leaders also start the process of developing and
he_press_office/Letter-from-President-Obama-to-Chairmen-Edward-M-Kennedy-and-MaxBaucus (“We should ask why places like the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, the Cleveland Clinic
in Ohio, and other institutions can offer the highest quality care at costs well below the
national norm. We need to learn from their successes and replicate those best practices across
our country. That’s how we can achieve reform that preserves and strengthens what’s best
about our healthcare system, while fixing what is broken.”); PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA,
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT MEETING WITH SENATE DEMOCRATS TO DISCUSS HEALTH CARE
(June 2, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentmeeting-with-senate-democrats-discuss-health-care (“So we’ve got to reform the underlying
system. And this means promoting best practices, not just the most expensive practices. And
one of the things I’m going to be discussing with the health and the finance committees is how
can we change incentive structures so that, for example, places like Mayo Clinic in Minnesota
are able to provide some of the best healthcare services in the country at half or sometimes
even less of the costs than some other areas where the quality is not as good.”).
23
In addition to being in the top three of each of these specialties, Mayo Clinic is
the top hospital in pulmonology; neurology and neurosurgery; nephrology; gynecology;
geriatrics; gastroenterology and GI surgery; ear, nose, and throat; and diabetes and
endocrinology. See U.S. News Best Hospitals 2014–15, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. [hereinafter
Best Hopsitals 2014–15], http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings (last visited July
22, 2014).
24
See Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum; see also Medicare
Spending Per Enrollee, By State, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicare/stateindicator/per-enrollee-spending-by-residence/ (last visited July 10, 2014) (citing Montana as
the lowest cost per enrollee at $7,576 per enrollee, with Minnesota averaging $8,941 per
enrollee, and New Jersey as the highest cost per enrollee at $11,903).
25
See generally DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 9 (Nov. 4, 2010), available
at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41474_20101104.pdf.
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establishing national standards, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the
U.S. health system cannot simply replicate the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser
Permanente26 through the ACO models that have been enacted. While the
goals of ACOs are consistent with the goals of the Triple Aim, the process of
actually creating a system that is more integrated and coordinated like the
Mayo Clinic and less like most other current (more fragmented and
expensive) systems will require continued thoughtful analysis. 27 Such
analysis must consider the ACO structure established under current
regulations, which structure must continue to evolve if the U.S. healthcare
system is ever to realize the Triple Aim.
This article argues that in order to maintain the focus applied during
the drafting and ultimate enactment of the ACA, and ensure that healthcare is
provided in furtherance of the Triple Aim, the current ACO structure
requires attention, direction, development, and ultimately amendment
because it currently lacks applicability to those integrated systems that were
intended to be leaders towards healthcare reform, such as the Mayo Clinic.
Part II of this Article will describe the basis of the Triple Aim and the
intended embodiment of the Triple Aim in the development of ACOs under
the ACA. Part III will examine the Mayo Clinic and other integrated delivery
systems to consider whether or not such systems, which have long been
touted as beacons of quality and cost effectiveness, are already achieving the
Triple Aim and further consider how these integrated delivery systems have
responded to the ACO movement and their impact on participation or lack of
participation in such movement. Part IV will examine some of the challenges
of the current ACO structure as it exists today, focusing on Minnesota and
the Mayo Clinic as a case study. It will further offer some recommendations
for amendments to the ACO structure that will ensure that the healthcare
delivery system that ultimately arises out of the ACO movement does not
lose sight of the original goals of the Triple Aim, which can only be
accomplished and achieved if the ACO structure is open and accessible to all
providers, including academic medical centers (“AMCs”) and other
integrated delivery systems.28 Finally, this Article will conclude in Part V by
26

Reed Abelson, The Face of Future Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/business/kaiser-permanente-is-seen-as-face-of-futurehealth-care.html?_r=1& (Kaiser Permanente is a similarly touted system in California that is
seen as a model of integrated care, which is able to maintain quality services, but without
experiencing run-away healthcare spending).
27
See Gawande, supra note 24 (comparing the Mayo Clinic and the high quality,
low cost care that it is able to provide to its patients to the fragmented and highly expensive
healthcare structure operating in McAllen, Texas).
28
See generally John A. Kastor, Accountable Care Organizations at Academic
Medical Centers, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7 (Feb. 17, 2011); Melanie Evans, Beyond ACOs,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 22, 2013) [hereinafter Evans, Beyond ACOs]; Justin Kearns,
Rural Roads to ACOs: Inter-Community Collaboration is Key to Rural Accountable Care
Organizations’ Success Under Medicare Shared Savings Program, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 425
(2013).
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noting that an ACO system that does not provide accessibility to all
providers will ultimately be unsuccessful in achieving the Triple Aim
envisioned under the ACA.
II. THE TRIPLE AIM AND THE ACA
The Triple Aim is a concept that pre-dates the ACA and was
developed in 2006 through the IHI.29 In response to consistently poor
“scorecards” for the U.S. healthcare system,30 Berwick and the IHI believed
there was a need to shift the paradigm of the delivery of healthcare in the
United States in an effort to address the fact that the U.S. healthcare system
“lacks the capacity to integrate its work over time and across sites of care.”31
The Triple Aim focuses on meeting, simultaneously, three goals in the
delivery of healthcare: “improving the individual experience of care;
improving the health of populations; and reducing the per capita costs of care
for populations.”32 As one can note from the continued use of the word
“population,” the IHI emphasizes the need for this framework to be applied
for all individuals receiving healthcare in the U.S.33 While each of the goals
of the Triple Aim are important aspects of healthcare reform processes,
Berwick believes that “the promise of equity” should be the most important
policy consideration; that is, each of the aims must be pursued on parallel
tracks34 and achieving the Triple Aim cannot mean providing improved
outcomes to only a small subpopulation at the expense of another, but must
contemplate better population health for all.35
Much of Berwick’s premises and ultimate recommendations for
reform are seeded by current ills of the U.S. healthcare system.36 Certainly,
for some populations in the U.S., the healthcare system here is better than
any other in the world, the Mayo Clinic being a prime example given its
29

See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760.
See id. (citing Commonwealth Fund Commission on High Performance Health
System in which U.S. scored an overall score of sixty six out of 100). Note that the U.S.
scorecard from the Commonwealth Fund Commission on High Performance System has not
improved with the U.S. scoring an overall score of 64 out of 100. See Why Not the Best?
Results from the National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 2011,
COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2011
/oct/why-not-the-best-2011 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). Note, however, that the report is
based on data from 2007–2009, as an update from that last most recent data, and “does not
fully reflect the effects of the recent economic recession on access to and use of care.” Id. It
also fails to include whether any improvements have been made since the enactment of the
ACA. Id.
31
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 759.
32
Id. at 760.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. Berwick has called pursuit of the Triple Aim as “an exercise in balance [to
be] subject to specified policy constraints, such as decisions about how much to spend on
healthcare or what coverage to provide and to whom.” Id.
36
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760.
30
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international reputation for excellent care.37 As is demonstrated by the
findings of the Commonwealth Fund, however, for others in this country the
care that is provided, or at least the outcomes resulting from the care or lack
of care to certain vulnerable populations, is worse than other developed or
developing countries.38 In addition to the health disparities among certain
subpopulations, certain models of care that have been utilized in the U.S.,
such as the managed care model, have focused on cost containment to the
detriment of patient satisfaction.39 Thus, from Berwick’s perspective, it is not
enough to succeed on one or two of the aims and it is also not enough for
certain subpopulations of a few individuals to succeed in all three of the
aims. For the Triple Aim to realize the change the IHI is proposing, the
healthcare delivery system must achieve all three aims together in a manner
that results in better care for all.40
In defining and describing the Triple Aim, Berwick identified certain
“preconditions” for pursuit of the Triple Aim, which are required because of
specific “design constraints” inherent in the U.S. system.41 More specifically,
Berwick asserts that to accomplish the Triple Aim, the following
preconditions must be established: (a) create a definition of “population”
under the Triple Aim that relates to enrollment and ability to track and
monitor a patient, as opposed to a geographic population;42 (b) create policy
constraints that will balance each of the aims in order to achieve all, as

37
The Mayo Clinic has an international reputation and sections of its website are
dedicated to its international medicine practice, which “serves patients who come from outside
the United States seeking medical care at Mayo Clinic.” Mayo Clinic Staff, International
Medicine Practice, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-centers/generalinternal-medicine/minnesota/overview/specialty-groups/international-medicine-practice (last
visited July 28, 2014). Services include consultative care for international patients, coordinate
of international patient care, preventative screening services for health maintenance, and
collaborative care of patients with chronic medical illnesses. Id. See also Patients Beyond
Borders, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.patientsbeyondborders.com/hospital/mayo-clinic (last
visited July 28, 2014) (“Each year more than 8,000 international patients from 140 countries
travel to one of Mayo’s locations.”).
38
See Davis, supra note 10, at 8.
39
See generally Berwick, supra note 7; see also generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel,
Why Accountable Care Organizations are Not 1990s Managed Care Redux, 21 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N. 307 (June 6, 2012).
40
Berwick refers to “universal coverage” as “The Holy Grail” and thus views a
system in which we have the effects of a single-payor system, but without the obligation of the
government to provide it, as the ultimate goal of healthcare in the United States. See Berwick,
supra note 7, at 761.
41
Id. at 762–63.
42
Id. Berwick states that for purposes of accomplishing the aims for a
“population” it is not necessary to think about populations in terms of where they live, but a
group of people for who certain care goals can be achieved. An example might be a definition
such as, “all of the diabetics in Massachusetts” or “members of Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound.” Id. Berwick believes that this definition is essential because only when we can
define a specific population can we start to consider what that population’s experiences are
relative to healthcare, health status, and the costs related to caring for such a population. Id.
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opposed to simply one, aim; and (c) identify an “integrator.”43 The authors
define this “integrator” as a single entity that accepts responsibility for
implementation of the Triple Aim across its “population” (however such
“population” has been defined).44
While all preconditions are critical, Berwick believes that
identification of an integrator is a key component of pursuit of the Triple
Aim, as it is critical to have an entity that links healthcare organizations
together in order to overlap the “spectrum of delivery.”45 One example of an
integrator could be Kaiser Permanente, but Berwick notes that effective
integrators are really any entities that can link healthcare organizations
“whose missions overlap across the spectrum of delivery.”46 As Berwick
states, “[t]he important function of linking organizations across the
continuum requires that the integrator be a single organization (not just a
market dynamic) that can induce coordinative behavior among health service
suppliers to work as a system for the defined population.”47 Under the ACA,
this function could be filled by the management of the ACO, but the
definition is not limited only to ACOs and could be filled by various
entities.48
A. Distinctions Between the Triple Aim and Managed Care
The general concepts espoused through the Triple Aim perhaps seem
obvious, self-evident, or even familiar health policy. Indeed, Berwick and his
colleagues at IHI acknowledge that the general theme is not entirely new
and, in fact, is already being implemented to some extent in different
programs across the country.49 Berwick further acknowledges that the goals
of the Triple Aim are not unlike the goals of the managed care movement of
the 1980s and 1990s and the emergence of HMOs, as he has stated, “As
conceived by their greatest champion, Paul Ellwood, HMOs were, or were
intended to be, integrators exactly as we propose, in pursuit of the Triple
Aim.”50
If IHI is correct and managed care and HMOs have been aspiring to
the same goals as the Triple Aim for years, what then is different about the
43

Id. at 762–63.
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 762–63.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 1395j.
49
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 766 (noting that the Veterans Health
Administration, the Indian Health Service, and the Military Health Command are all examples
of integrated systems within government and that classic HMOs and systems like Kaiser
Permanente, HealthPartners, and Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (combinations of
the provision of services and insurance) as examples in the commercial system).
50
Id. at 766 (citing P.M. Ellwood et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED.
CARE 291 (1971)).
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Triple Aim and the ACO movement today, and why does IHI believe the
Triple Aim can accomplish what HMOs could not? Much has been written
since the emergence of ACOs regarding this exact question; that is, are
ACOs really all that different from HMOs?51 Berwick’s response is that
while HMOs appeared to hold the same goals as the Triple Aim, HMOs were
not, in fact, applying the Triple Aim as he and others conceived it:
The HMO movement was eventually defined by its organizational
structure rather than its aims and performance. The experience of people
enrolled in HMOs was not sufficiently improved to overcome the restriction
of choice of providers or the perceived barriers to access to specialists that
became part of the HMO model. Because they restricted care, HMOs were
vulnerable to competitive retaliation by indemnity insurers and others, which
began offering products called “HMO” or “managed care” that merely
managed money, not care.52
Essentially, argues Berwick, HMOs failed to fulfill that aspect of the
Triple Aim that improves the patient experience of care, allowing instead
cost containment to become the sole driver.53 This can be seen by example in
many of the state laws that were enacted in response to the rise of HMOs in
the 1990s.54 The Minnesota legislature, for example, amended Chapter 62D
of the Insurance Title to address concerns regarding the operations and
practices of health maintenance organizations.55 Minnesota’s § 62D.12 lists
the “prohibited practices” of managed care companies, which prohibitions
include, inter alia, denying or limiting coverage of a service that the enrollee
has already received solely on the basis of lack of prior authorization or
second opinion if the service would have otherwise been covered absent that
authorization process.56 While denials and prior authorizations were viewed
negatively from a consumer protection perspective (and thus many other
states’ enacted laws that echoed Minnesota’s law), such approaches were

51

See Emanuel, supra note 39, at 2263; see generally Muhlestein, The
Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13.
52
Berwick, supra note 7, at 766.
53
See generally Berwick, supra note 7; see also Anna Wilde Mathews, Can
Accountable-Care Organizations Improve Health Care While Reducing Costs?, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020472020457712890171457
6054 (noting a comment by Donald Berwick, stating: “[HMOs] required patients to stay
within their own networks, but, for many patients, the trade-off between loss of choice and
improved care was worth it. By the 1970s, however, mutant forms of managed care emerged
that kept the restrictions but not the care improvements. Doctors and patients sensed the game
and didn’t like it. By the 1980s, HMOs had a bad name.”).
54
See MINN STAT. §§ 62D.01–62D.24 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-32-101–
56-32-138 (2014) (Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1986); WIS. STAT. § 609.10
(2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.38-010 (West 2014); IOWA CODE §§ 514b.1–5146.33
(2014).
55
See MINN. STAT. §§ 62D.01–62D.24.
56
MINN. STAT. § 62D.12, subd. 19 (coverage of service); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-32-129.
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nevertheless successful cost containment measures for HMOs.57 Others have
arrived at similar conclusions as Berwick regarding some of the failings of
HMOs, finding that the limitations and restrictions that were implemented
for purposes of cost savings resulted in poor patient satisfaction, which
ultimately resulted in the consequent rejections of such plans by
consumers.58
B. Development of ACOs under the ACA
It is with the backdrop of both the benefits and the downfall of the
managed care movement of the 1980s and 1990s that the Obama
administration and legislators considered new delivery models under the
ACA.59 While there were many complaints and frustrations with the financial
drivers and data points that HMOs used to measure success (as opposed to
health outcomes), one thing that is difficult to argue with regarding the
managed care movement is that it saved money.60 Thus, when considering
how to reform the healthcare system and the spiraling healthcare costs that
have developed since the managed care movement was curbed through
consumer protection laws, legislators and policy experts were keenly aware
that certain aspects of the managed care movement needed to be a part of the
new system of reform.61 But, they were also keenly aware that simply
creating a new statutory scheme of HMOs with a new name would also not
be effective change.62 This is where the Triple Aim and the development of
accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) came into play: ACOs share many
of the same goals of the managed care movement, but are intended to bring
the focus away from solely cost containment.63 That change in focus is
highlighted by two key differences between ACOs and HMOs: (1) ACOs
manage care through providers (as opposed to insurers), utilizing outcome57

Morrell, supra note 20, at 242.
See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 3 (stating
“MCOs, though, came to be seen as limiting patient choice and potentially rationing necessary
healthcare services to increase profits through limited networks of providers, stiff gatekeeping
requirements and utilization review, resulting in insurer-based ‘death panels’ where
anonymous underwriters determined who received care”); Morrel, supra note 20, at 242;
Martin Markovich, The Rise of HMOs, RAND CORP. (2003), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD172/RGSD172.ch1.pdf
(last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
59
See Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1373.
60
See Markovich, supra note 58, at 13 (“The effectiveness of HMOs in
controlling costs has been the subject of a tremendous volume of research and analysis. . . .
The balance of the evidence indicates that HMOs have reduced overall healthcare costs
through several mechanisms and substantially contributed to the cost de-escalation of the
1990s. This de-escalation has caused costs to recede as an issue in the consciousness of the
public, the press, and elected officials.”).
61
Id.; see Morrell, supra note 20, at 242–43.
62
See Morrell, supra note 20, at 243; Muhlestein, The Accountable Care
Paradigm, supra note 13, at 7.
63
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760.
58
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driven data and quality metrics, as opposed to financial measures, and (2)
ACOs have access to technological advancements in patient tracking and
monitoring, enabling a new and improved approach to healthcare delivery.64
ACOs, as defined under the ACA, are legal entities organized as
groups of providers of services and suppliers who work together to manage
and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through
accountability for quality, cost, and overall care65 through the MSSP.66 In an
effort to incentivize this coordination of care, the MSSP program attempts to
align participating providers/suppliers with one another (particularly
hospitals and physicians) by agreeing to share with the ACO any savings that
the Medicare program might realize from healthcare expenditures for the
same Medicare beneficiaries in previous years.67
At its heart, the MSSP program is much like a gainsharing
program.68 Gainsharing arrangements have been the subject of much
analysis, research, and discussion since the 1990s, which the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) has addressed in several advisory
opinions.69 As recognized by CMS and the requestors in these advisory
64

See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 4.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. 1395jjj.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Newman, supra note 25, at 9; see also generally Nicole MartinganoReinhart, Gainsharing and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 43 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1325, 1348 (2013).
69
OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-1, 2001 WL 36190940 (Jan. 11, 2001),
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/ao01-01.pdf; OIG Advisory
Opinion No. 05-01, 2005 WL 6289864 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0501.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-02, 2005 WL
6289865 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005
/ao0502.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-03, 2005 WL 6289866 (Feb. 10, 2005), available
at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0503.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 05-04, 2005 WL 6289867 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs
/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0504.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-05, 2005 WL 6289868
(Feb. 18, 2005), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005
/ao0505.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-06, 2005 WL 6289869 (Feb. 18, 2005), available
at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2005/ao0506.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 06-22, 2006 WL 6252293 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs
/advisoryopinions/2006/AdvOpn06-22NewA.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-21, 2007
WL 6400848 (Dec. 28, 2007), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopini
ons/2007/AdvOpn07-21A.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-22, 2007 WL 6400849
(Dec. 28, 2007), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2007/Adv
Opn07-22A.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-09, 2008 WL 6067519 (July 31, 2008),
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2008/AdvOpn08-09B.pdf; OIG
Advisory Opinion No. 08-15, 2008 WL 6067525 (Oct. 06, 2008), available at https://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2008/AdvOpn08-15.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 08-21, (Nov. 25, 2008), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/
2008/AdvOpn08-21.2.pdf; OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, 2009 WL 2371264 (June 23,
2009), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2009/AdvOpn09-06.pdf;
OIG Advisory Opinion No. 12-22, 2012 WL 7148098 (Dec. 31, 2012), available
at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2012/AdvOpn12-22.pdf.
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opinions, gainsharing arrangements were first proposed in order to align the
actions of a hospital’s medical staff with that of the hospital itself.70 While
CMS has lauded the perceived benefits of gainsharing, approved certain
limited gainsharing proposals, and funded several pilot programs,71 it has
consistently held the opinion that gainsharing programs are not permissible
under the Anti-kickback Statute72 and the Civil Monetary Penalties Act73 due
to the concern that gainsharing will ultimately drive providers (physicians
and hospitals alike) to reduce the amount of care or lower the quality of care
that is provided to beneficiaries.74 Despite the concerns expressed by CMS in
various advisory opinions, the concept of shared savings programs and their
system of using such provider collaborations for purposes of improving the
healthcare delivery system eventually made an impact on Congress, resulting
in the development of the ACO model and the MSSP under the ACA.75
ACOs, as they have come to be known, have their origins with Elliot
Fisher and the Dartmouth Atlas Project, who first described an ACO as:
“provider collaborations that integrate groups of physicians, hospitals, and
other providers around the ability to receive shared-savings bonuses by
achieving measured quality targets and demonstrating real reductions in
overall spending growth for a defined population of patients.”76 The ideas
expressed by Fisher, Dartmouth Atlas Project, and others started to gain

70
See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The need for these incentives arises
out of the differences between the manner in which hospitals are paid versus physicians under
the Medicare program. Hospitals are paid based on a diagnosis related group (DRG), which is
a flat fee payment based on a particular condition of the patient. For a detailed description of
DRGs, see BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 785–
88 (7th ed., 2013). In contrast to this, physicians participating in the Medicare program are
paid on a fee-for-service basis for each procedure, exam, or other service performed. Id. This
distinction in payment structure creates a system in which the hospital would like to
encourage the physician to provide fewer services, given that the hospital will only receive the
amount as is appropriate for the patient’s designated diagnosis code, whereas the physician is
motivated from a revenue generation perspective to order as many tests as can be supported as
medically necessary. Id.
71
See note 69 and accompanying text. CMS funded the Medicare Physician
Group Practice Demonstration, which demonstrated project tested forms of gainsharing. See
generally JOHN KAUTTER ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE
DEMONSTRATION, FINAL REPORT (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Demonstration-Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/Downloads/PhysicianGroupPracticeFinal
Report.pdf.
72
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2014).
73
Id. § 1320a-7a (2014).
74
See id. §§ 1320a-7b, 1320a-7a.; see 73 Fed. Reg. 38502, 38550 (July 7, 2008)
(noting five concerns regarding gainsharing including stinting).
75
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
76
Aaron McKethan & Mark McClellan, Moving from Volume-Driven Medicine
Toward Accountable Care, Health Affairs Blog (Aug. 20, 2009); see generally Elliot Fisher et
al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH
AFFAIRS (2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full.
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widespread attention77 and eventually made its way to MedPac in 2009.
MedPac issued a report to Congress, one section of which was titled Why
Medicare May Want Accountable Care Organizations.78 MedPac’s support
for ACOs in the report stemmed in large part from its observations that
Medicare was on an unsustainable trajectory regarding spending and
proposed ACOs as a new mechanism for potentially curbing the trajectory.79
The report made specific mention of certain gainsharing models that were
already being tested under then-current Physician Group Practice (“PGP”)
demonstration and provided examples for how the concept might be
expanded to a larger scale.80 As the concept of the ACO and shared savings
began to move through Congress, the underpinnings of the Triple Aim and
the ascent of the ACO started to work in concert, resulting in an ACOdefinition that focused not only on cost savings, but promotion of
accountability for an entire patient population, and also the redesign of care
processes for high quality and efficient service delivery.81
III. CONSIDERING THE MAYO CLINIC AND ACOS UNDER THE
ACA
Themes of the Triple Aim are present in the language of the ACA,
and the focus on integration in the ACO regulations moves many providers
closer to the idea of achieving the Triple Aim more than ever before.82 In
fact, Berwick himself sees ACOs as a step in the right direction, stating,
“Taken together, [the changes to the final regulations for ACOs] create a
more feasible and attractive on-ramp for a diverse set of providers and
organizations to participate as ACOs. . . . We believe that today’s ACO rule
is the next step in our shared commitment to a better, more lasting healthcare
system.”83 While the revised regulations may be moving some providers
closer towards achieving the goals of the Triple Aim, those entities lauded as
models of accountable care and for purposes of developing the ACO
structure are, for the most part, not participating in an ACO or the MSSP.84
77

See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1760 (2011).
78
MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE
PROGRAM, 39 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Jun09_
EntireReport.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
79
Id. at 43.
80
Id. at 40.
81
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
82
See Donald M. Berwick, M.D., Making Good on ACOs’ Promise—The Final
Rules for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (2011)
[hereinafter Berwick, Making Good on ACOs’ Promise].
83
Id. at 1755–56.
84
See Medicare Shared Savings Programs Accountable Care Organizations,
DATA.CMS.GOV, https://data.cms.gov/ACO/Medicare-Shared-Savings-Program-AccountableCare-O/pfam-u3vp (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); see generally Pioneer ACO Model, CMS.GOV,
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
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This disconnect between those healthcare systems intended to be emulated
for purposes of healthcare delivery because of their ability to achieve the
Triple Aim, like the Mayo Clinic, and their lack of participation in the ACO
structure under the ACA calls into question whether the ACO regulations, as
drafted, are in fact accomplishing the goals they were set out to establish. In
order to understand this disconnect, it is necessary to examine first whether
the Mayo Clinic and other similarly integrated systems are not participating
as ACOs in either the MSSP or the Pioneer ACO Program.85
A. Integrated Delivery Systems and ACO Participation
As President Obama toured the United States in 2009 promoting the
ACA, he frequently referred to Geisinger Health System, Intermountain
Health System, Mayo Clinic, and other integrated delivery models as
systems that he believed already served as models of how healthcare should
be provided to all U.S. citizens.86 It is certainly true that many of these
integrated delivery systems seem to have figured out how to provide quality
care, without excess spending on a per capita basis under the Medicare
program.87 In an article that was considered required reading for the Obama

85
The ACA established the MSSP in connection with formation of an ACO
under § 3022 of the ACA. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. In
2012, the CMS Innovation Center, established under Section 1115A of the ACA, launched a
second program known as the Pioneer ACO Program, working in concert with the MSSP,
which was intended for those entities who had previously participated in Physicians Group
Practice demonstration projects. See Accountable Care Organization Model: General Fact
Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 12, 2012) available at http://
innovation.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
There
were
initially 32 entities that were selected to participate in the Pioneer ACO Program. Id. Unlike
the Pioneer ACO Program, which requires that participants be at-risk for the shared savings
and losses from the beginning of the program, the MSSP offers a sort of “phase in” for twosided risk in which the ACO can either be responsible for both a share of the losses and the
savings, in exchange for a higher share of the savings, or only take part in the savings. 76 Fed.
Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425). Under the final rule, no ACO
participating in the MSSP can stay on a one-sided risk model forever, as all ACOs must
transition to two-sided risk by the end of three years. Id. Note that proposed rules were
published on December 8, 2014, which rules contemplate permitting ACOs to remain in a
one-sided risk-model for an additional period of time. 79 Fed. Reg. 72760, 72869 (Dec. 8,
2014) (amending 42 C.F.R. § 425.600(b)).
86
On the President’s Radar Screen, GEISINGER ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, http://www.
geisinger.edu/med-ed/clin_camp/pages/president.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); Bernie
Monegain, Intermountain, Geisinger get Spotlight in Obama Speech, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS
(July 1, 2009), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/intermountain-geisinger-get-spotlightobama-speech; John Daly, Obama Singles Out Intermountain Healthcare as a Model System,
KSL NEWS 5 (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=7873613 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014);
OBAMA REMARKS, supra note 15.
87
See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE SPENDING: A
CLOSER LOOK (2009) [hereinafter AHA], available at file:///C:/Users/Jon/Downloads
/twnov09geovariation.pdf.
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administration during the period leading up to enactment of the ACA,88 Atul
Gawande explored the cost of healthcare spending relative to its outcomes in
The Cost Conundrum in THE NEW YORKER.89 Gawande highlighted the
Mayo Clinic for its high quality and cost containment successes, stating:
Americans like to believe that, with most things, more is
better. But research suggests that where medicine is
concerned it may actually be worse. For example, Rochester,
Minnesota, where the Mayo Clinic dominates the scene, has
fantastically high levels of technological capability and
quality, but its Medicare spending is in the lowest fifteen
percent of the country - $6,688 per enrollee in 2006, which
is eight thousand dollars less than the figure for McAllen[,
Texas].90
Much of Gawande’s findings were based on a study published by
The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy & Clinic Practice, which study
explored care provided to patients with severe chronic illness.91 In one
chapter of the Dartmouth Institute’s study, the authors examine America’s
“best hospitals” regarding their management of chronic illness, and find that
despite possessing superior clinical scientific knowledge, academic medical
centers vary greatly in how they manage chronic illnesses.92 After an
examination of the various practices of academic medical centers in general,
the authors established the Mayo Clinic as a model academic medical center
due to its “strong national reputation for quality, while simultaneously [being
able to keep] utilization and costs relatively low.”93 The authors further
suggested using the Mayo Clinic as a benchmark for “a strategy to reduce
overuse of the acute care sector in managing chronic illness.”94 In
88
Robert Pear, Health Care Spending Disparities Stir a Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics/09health.html?ref=todayspaper&_r
=1& (“President Obama recently summoned aides to the Oval Office to discuss a magazine
article investigating why the border town of McAllen, Tex., was the country’s most expensive
place for healthcare. The article became required reading in the White house, with Mr. Obama
even citing it at a meeting last week with two dozen Democratic senators.”).
89
See Gawande, supra note 24.
90
Id. The author examined the city of McAllen, Texas, which according to
statistics in 2009 had the highest spending per Medicare enrollee of any city in the country.
91
JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE, TRACKING THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: THE
DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE 2008 (2008), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.
org/downloads/atlases/2008_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf.
92
Id. at 39 (noting that “academic medical centers vary widely on all three
measures – resources, utilization, and spending-a finding that raises a serious challenge to the
assumption that clinical science plays a dominant role in determining the patterns of medical
practice at these prestigious hospitals”).
93
Id. at 40.
94
Id. But see Peter J. Nelson, The Mayo Clinic: High Quality Yes, but Low Cost?,
CENTER OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.americanexperiment
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considering this information and its delivery of care in light of the goals of
the Triple Aim, the Mayo Clinic appears to embody all prongs of the Triple
Aim: namely, quality care for the patient, quality care for populations, and
cost-effective care.95 The question remains, then: if the Mayo Clinic is
achieving the Triple Aim, why is it, or other systems like it, not forming an
ACO or participating in the MSSP, which is supposed to be the embodiment
of the Triple Aim?
Ironically, the Mayo Clinic’s lack of participation is not unique;
indeed, many of the systems that were promoted as models for development
of an ACO structure have not formed ACOs and are not participating in the
MSSP.96 The reasons that wide-spread adoption of the ACO structure by
integrated delivery systems such as the Mayo Clinic are varied. One of the
primary reasons is existing challenges for many of these organizations to
make a profit, or break-even, on Medicare patients, thus making achievement
of any shared savings a near impossibility.97 As Gawande noted, data
indicates that Mayo Clinic spending on its Medicare patients is lower on
average than other institutions; however, such successes do not necessarily
indicate that the Mayo Clinic is realizing increased revenues or “profits”
from these patients.98
In considering Gawande’s observations of the Mayo Clinic, author
Peter Nelson noted that while the Mayo Clinic has demonstrated success on
.org/publications/policy-in-detail/the-mayo-clinic-high-quality-yes-but-low-cost (finding that
“when it comes to understanding value-the intersection between cost and quality-the
Dartmouth research is limited by the fact that it covers only Medicare patients. In Medicare,
the government sets prices and, as a result, the prices in the Dartmouth data reflect national
Medicare policies and do not reflect the price of healthcare services negotiated between
private health plans and providers more generally. . . . Evidence shows that the Mayo Clinic is
actually a high cost provider when compared to other Minnesota providers.”).
95
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 760.
96
As of the middle of 2014, while there were 366 ACOs registered in the MSSP,
less than 15 of these ACOs were large academic medical centers. See Medicare Shared
Savings Program, CMS.GOV, https://data.cms.gov/ACO/Medicare-Shared-Savings-ProgramAccountable-Care-O/ay8x-m5k6 (last visited June 27, 2014). Neither Mayo Clinic, Kaiser
Permanente, nor Intermountain have registered as ACOs under the MSSP or under the Pioneer
ACO program.
97
It was reported that the Mayo Clinic lost $840 million on Medicare patients in
2009 and due to similar circumstances in their Arizona facilities have begun to require a
$2,000 retainer fee with a $250 administrative fee for Medicare patients, as all Mayo Clinic
facilities are non-participating in the Medicare program because they do not accept Medicare
Part B. See also Medicare and the Mayo, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748703436504574640711655886136. See Tony Brayer, Why the
Mayo Clinic is Refusing to See Medicare Patients, KEVINMD (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.
kevinmd.com/blog/2010/01/mayo-clinic-refusing-medicare-patients.html.
98
See Gawande, supra note 24; see also Total Medicare Reimbursements per
Enrollee, by Adjustment Type (Year: 2010), THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE,
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/topic/topic.aspx?cat=21 (last visited, Mar. 28, 2015)
(noting that Minnesota has an average Medicare spending rate of between $6,911 and $8,100
with Rochester, Minnesota with a spending rate of $7,229, which is among the lowest in the
United States).
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its Medicare spending for Medicare beneficiaries, such lower spending may
be offset by what appears to be higher than average reimbursement on
services from third party commercial payors.99 In fact, research from
Dartmouth Medical School supports a finding that Medicare patients at the
Mayo Clinic consistently pay far less than, and have superior outcomes
relative to, other systems across the country.100 Such research also finds,
however, that spending for Medicare patients is different relative to the
average of overall spending for all patients in the state of Minnesota.101
Nelson believes that such distinctions exist because the study is limited to
only a study of Medicare patients and does not reflect the price that private
individuals pay through commercial insurance.102 Thus, Nelson argues, while
it appears that Mayo Clinic’s Medicare costs per beneficiary demonstrate
greater efficiency, the Mayo Clinic currently offsets such shortfalls by being
one of the highest priced providers in the Minnesota market when it comes to
commercial insurance.103
Nelson’s observations regarding the high cost of care at the Mayo
Clinic for patients with private insurance is not only evidenced in historic
data regarding the difference in average spending on Medicare beneficiaries
and overall spending,104 but has also been evidenced through the insurance
market and, most recently, the health insurance exchanges in Minnesota.105
Although Minnesota as a state spends at or below average for Medicare
patients,106 average commercial insurance premiums for family coverage are
above average, with Minnesota as one of the highest ten states in the
nation.107 More precisely, Minnesotans who live in the southeastern part of
the state who attempted to purchase insurance on Minnesota’s health
insurance exchange, MNSure, experienced higher premiums on average than
in other parts of the state and fewer options for providers than in other areas
99

See Nelson, supra note 94.
Id.
101
See AHA, supra note 87, at 14.
102
Id. at 10, 13.
103
Id.
104
See generally id.
105
See Associated Press, Mayo’s Dominance Skews Health Insurance Exchange in
SE Minnesota, PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Mayo’s Dominance],
http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_24405205/mayos-dominance-skews-healthinsurance-exchange-southeastern-minnesota.
106
See AHA, supra note 87, at 4 (noting that Minnesota has below average
unadjusted spending per beneficiary and an average spending per beneficiary when adjusted
for wages, health status, graduate medical education, indirect medical education, and
disproportionate share hospital payments).
107
See id.; Cathy Schoen et al., Paying the Price: How Health Insurance
Premiums Are Eating Up Middle Class Incomes, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 8 (2009),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/databrief/2009/aug/1313_schoen_paying_the_price_db_v3_resorted_tables.pdf
(noting
that
Minnesota families’ average commercial insurance premiums for family coverage is in excess
of $13,001 per family, which is higher than the national average of $12,298).
100
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of the state.108 Experts believe that the reason for this skewed effect in this
region is due to the presence of the Mayo Clinic in southeast Minnesota and
the higher costs that insurers have to pay for services at the facility.109
The effect of this high-cost is likely evident in the fact that the Mayo
Clinic is currently only available as an in-network provider in one plan
available on the health insurance exchange in Minnesota, although there are
other insurers in the state who are in talks with the Mayo Clinic to include
them in other networks in the future.110 Note, however, that the Mayo Clinic
is not alone in this phenomenon.111 Of the top 18 institutions nationally
ranked by U.S. News and World Report, six institutions accept only one
insurance plan on the exchange (including, without limitation, Cleveland
Clinic and UCSF Medical Center) and five accept only two insurance plans
on the exchange (including, without limitation, UCLA Medical Center and
Northwestern Memorial Hospital).112
For some insurers, regardless of the cost, there is no option but to
contract with certain academic medical centers for services, as some AMCs,
especially those that provide specialty pediatric care, are considered
“essential community providers” under the ACA and thus are required to be
108
Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105 (noting that Sandra Toogood checked her
options in October of 2013 and found only one plan that included the Mayo Clinic, the main
provider in her area, and as a 55 year old with no available subsidies her monthly premium
was $594 for a mid-level plan, which compared to $268 per month in St. Paul/Minneapolis,
Minnesota).
109
Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105.
110
Patrick Howley, Hospital Cited by Obama as Health-Reform Model for the
Nation Accepts only One Kind of Insurance Plan under Obamacare, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 23,
2014),
http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/23/hospital-cited-by-obama-as-health-reform-modelfor-the-nation-accepts-only-one-kind-of-insurance-plan-under-obamacare/ (noting that the
only insurance exchange offering that is accepted at the Mayo Clinic is the Blue Cross Blue
Shield silver plans); see also Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105 (stating that “Officials with
Medica, another major Minnesota provider, said they’re working with regulators to offer
individual and small group plans in Rochester on the exchange as early as next year. The
company currently offers plans in the rest of Olmstead County, but not in the two Rochester
ZIP codes.”).
111
See Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105 (finding that the insurance premiums
being higher are not uncommon in other parts of the country where there is a single, dominant
provider).
112
See Tori Richards, Top Hospitals Opt Out of Obamacare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/hospital-of-tomorrow/articles
/2013/10/30/top-hospitals-opt-out-of-obamacare; see also Which Hospitals Take Your Health
Insurance Under Obamacare?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://
health.usnews.com/health-news/hospital-of-tomorrow/articles/2013/10/30/which-top-hospi
tals-take-your-health-insurance-under-obamacare. Regarding the remainder, three accept only
three insurance plans on the exchange (including, without limitation, New York-Presbyterian
University Hospital of Columbia and Cornell and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center)
and three of the four remaining hospitals accept all insurance offerings on the exchange,
pursuant to requirements under state law, including top-ranked Johns Hopkins. Note that the
data is based on the 2013–2014 rankings for U.S. News and World Report, but since the date
of the article U.S. News and World Report has released the 2014–2015 rankings. See Best
Hopsitals 2014–15, supra note 23.
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included in all health insurance options.113 For those insurers who have
options, however, they are more reticent, or at least very concerned,
regarding the inclusion of high-cost providers in their networks.114 Prior to
the ACA, paying certain providers, such as AMCs, higher rates for services
was less of a cause for concern for insurers because insurers could simply
raise premiums on their insureds based on certain rating factors.115 For
example, if an insurance company received an application from an individual
in his or her 50s who smokes, has a previous history of heart disease, and a
family history of cancer, the insurance company could either refuse to insure
the individual or require the individual to pay an extremely high premium,
based on the fact that the insurer is likely to end up spending more on this
individual than others due to pre-existing conditions and family history.
Under the ACA, insurance companies are prevented from denying
individuals insurance coverage based on pre-existing conditions and limited
in their ability to rate individuals based on anything other than age and
tobacco use.116 Additionally, for those insurers who are participating in the
exchanges, the insurers have no idea what sort of a population “mix” they
will receive in their new exchange plans.117 It is possible that an insurer
offering insurance on the exchange might end up insuring a population of
individuals who are all older and sicker than average individuals. Ensuring
113
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021 (2014),
18031(c)(1)(C) (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 156.235 (defining “essential community providers” as
“providers that serve predominantly low-income, medically underserved individuals,
including providers that [are eligible to receive § 340B(a)(4) funding under the Public Health
Services Act or are defined under Section 1927(c)(1)(D)(i)(iv) of the ACA].”). But see Steve
Davis, Narrow Network Lawsuit Takes Odd Turn; Premera Seeks to Dismiss Judge’s
Decisions, HEALTH BUS. DAILY (July 7, 2014), http://aishealth.com/archive/nblu0714-01
(noting that Seattle Children’s Hospital filed a lawsuit against the insurance commissioner in
connection with its exclusion from certain exchange plan offerings on the Washington state
exchange, Healthplanfinder) and Joe Carlson, Exchange Exclusion Suit, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http:
114
Due to restrictions under the ACA regarding the ability of insurers to deny
coverage for or rate certain individuals, insurers have less ability to manage risk through
selection of beneficiaries and therefore are looking towards other means to ensure cost
savings. See M.P. McQueen, Less Choice, Lower Premiums, Many Exchange Plans Will Offer
Narrow Networks, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/article/20130817/MAGAZINE/308179921.
115
See David Orentilcher, The Future of the Affordable Care Act: Protecting
Economic Health More Than Physical Health, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2014) (“Before
the ACA’s reform of the individual market, high premiums caused by preexisting conditions
created a substantial obstacle to job mobility.”).
116
42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
117
See Sara R. Collins et al., Covering Young Adults Under the Affordable Care
Act: The Importance of Outreach and Medicaid Expansion, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (2013),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2013/
aug/1701_collins_covering_young_adults_tracking_brief_final_v4.pdf
(“Young
adults’
participation in the nation’s new insurance marketplaces is essential: as a healthier-thanaverage population, it allows for comprehensive plans to be offered at affordable prices to all
enrollees over time.”).
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enrollment of young and healthy individuals on the exchanges was a key
focus for insurers, as healthy under-utilizers of services whose premiums are
in excess of claims are necessary to offset higher spending on older, sicker
individuals whose claims far exceed premium payments.118 Thus, given these
new market dynamics, insurers are suddenly less willing to contract with
historically higher-cost providers like AMCs.119
If the ACA and the MSSP are focused on Medicare beneficiaries,
and entities like the Mayo Clinic are performing well relative to spending on
Medicare beneficiaries, do premiums on the commercial side matter at all?
Indeed, the fact that the Mayo Clinic and other top-ranked institutions may
be reimbursed at a higher rate by commercial insurers does not indicate that
the individuals receiving care at those institutions are not provided with the
highest level of care.120 This is also not to say that the quality of services
provided to Medicare patients differs from those that are provided to
commercial pay patients or that the Mayo Clinic, based on its financial
incentives, does not actually provide more efficient care than other systems.
If the Mayo Clinic is equally efficient in the provision of its care to
its patients, why then are the costs from commercial insurance so much
higher? Kathleen Harrington, government relations chair of the Mayo Clinic,
states a similar argument to most other AMCs across the nation, which is that
the Mayo Clinic treats patients with very complex illnesses and supports the
cost of research and education, the costs of which are not borne by all
hospitals.121 Ms. Harrington states, “We’re not a community-based hospital.
This is an academic medical center that does research, education, and top-ofthe-pyramid care for the sickest of the sick. The cost is naturally higher.”122
These comments are not unique to the Mayo Clinic, as other AMCs and
research institutions experience similar issues: “The supervision and teaching
of trainees, whether in the hospital or in an outpatient clinic, take time, and
time costs money. Reducing the cost of training will require fundamental
changes in the way [that the mission of an AMC] is pursued.”123 Thus, while
it may be true that Mayo Clinic provides efficient and effective care for all of
its patients, certain aspects of what makes the Mayo Clinic a leader in its
field is due in part to the research, innovation, and training that are only
possible, to some extent, due to high reimbursement Mayo Clinic receives
from commercial insurers. In considering this reality in the context of ACOs
and the Triple Aim, it is evident that achieving the balance and equity that
Berwick contemplated in providing quality care that is available and

118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 1–2.
See Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105.
See Best Hospitals 2014–15, supra note 23.
See Mayo’s Dominance, supra note 105.
Id.
Kastor, supra note 28.
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accessible to all is challenging, even at our most efficient and renowned
quality institutions.124
Despite the intentions of legislators and regulators at CMS, the Mayo
Clinic and other providers that many thought would lead the country through
healthcare reform are opting instead for care delivery alternatives.125 In
addition to the challenges regarding Medicare payments cited above, a few
other themes have emerged from these healthcare leaders regarding their
respective decisions not to participate in either the MSSP or the Pioneer
ACO programs.126 Two of the primary issues for these providers relate to
reimbursement under Medicare and the manner in which the ACOs were
structured under the regulations.127 For example, in an interview given in
2011, George Halvorson, chair and CEO of Kaiser Permanente’s hospitals
and health plans, commented that part of the reason that they did not have
any plans to participate in the MSSP was due, in large part, to reimbursement
and also the complexity of the regulations:
Private care delivery can [provide integrated care now]. The
problem is they’re not paid for it. At [Kaiser Permanente] we
do six things for seniors that help keep bones from breaking,
and three of the six do not appear on a Blue Cross or
Medicare or Medicaid fee schedule….For Medicare, it
means that even though (the program isn’t) going to pay for
what the pharmacist and nurse do, if as a result of this you
save money on broken bones providers get half the savings.
Right now the caregivers who do that work get absolutely no
124

See Nelson, supra note 94, at 4 (stating “The evidence that Mayo is a high-cost
provider in Minnesota suggests that high-quality medical care does come at a higher price
when providers are free to negotiate, just like high-quality services in any other industry.
Consequently, in a Medicare system that pays Mayo for the true value that it provides, the
average patient will likely cost more than $53,432.”).
125
Chris Anderson, CMS Taps 32 Health Systems for Pioneer ACO Program,
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/cmstaps-32-health-systems-pioneer-aco-program?single-page=true (“Those systems, the Mayo
Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, Geisinger Health System and Intermountain Healthcare, are often
touted among the ‘poster boys’ for care quality and cost controls many want to see in a
revamped national healthcare system.”).
126
See Jenny Gold, ‘Poster Boys’ Take a Pass On Pioneer ACO Program, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Sep. 14, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/september
/14/aco-pioneers-medicare-hospitals.aspx. One entity that stands in contrast to some of the
other large integrated delivery systems is Geisinger Health, which is participating in the
Keystone ACO. See generally KEYSTONE ACO, available at http://www.keystoneaco.org/
(last visited July 1, 2014) (listing Geisinger Medical Center, Geisinger-Wyoming Valley
Medical Center, Geisinger-Community Medical Center, and Geisinger-Bloomsburg Hospital
as participating hospitals in the ACO).
127
Joanne Silberner, Head of Major HMO Sees Openings for Accountable Care
Organizations–the KHN Interview, Kaiser Health News (July 25, 2011), http://www.kaiser
healthnews.org/stories/2011/july/25/halvorson-q-and-a-kaiser-permanente-accountable-careorganizations.aspx.
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reward and actually lose revenue. But the version of ACOs
that was written into the law for Medicare is complex and
the law wasn’t as well drafted as it could have been.128
Halvorson’s comments regarding complexity have been echoed by
others. In a study released by Medical Group Management Association
(“MGMA”) in 2011, it communicated to CMS that, by MGMA’s estimate,
up to 90% of its members would likely not be participating in the MSSP due
to the complexity of the regulations and the expectations regarding the
reporting requirements.129 CMS attempted to address some of these concerns
with changes to the final ACO regulations130 and with the creation of the
Pioneer ACO Program; which was a coordinated effort to offer greater
incentives and greater simplification to encourage industry leaders such as
the Mayo Clinic to participate. The Pioneer ACO Program did attract some
AMCs and other integrated institutions, such as Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health
Pioneer ACO and Partners Healthcare, but the initial participation of AMCs
remained relatively low. 131 While Halvorson was somewhat critical of the
ACO regulations, he was more positive and encouraged by the possibilities
of other aspects of the ACA stating, “Medicare is creating some pilot
programs with ACOs, and I think there are going to be a few dozen of these
that are going to figure out ways of dealing with the patient population more
directly.”132
Intermountain cited similar frustrations with the ACO regulations,
but more so with aspects of the regulations that imposed little obligations on
128

See Silberner, supra note 128. Note that from the date of this interview, the
ACO regulations were revised somewhat, but as of the date of this article, Kaiser Permanente
is still not participating in any type of ACO program. Melanie Evans, Providers See Little
Enthusiasm to Join Pioneer ACOs, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Evans,
Providers See Little Enthusiasm to Join Pioneer ACOs], http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/article/20140901/NEWS/309019991/providers-see-little-enthusiasm-to-join-pioneeracos. See Silberner, supra note 127.
129
See Anderson, supra note 125.
130
For example, one of the primary complaints is related to the reporting of
quality metrics. The initial regulations required the reporting of 65 different measures. 76 Fed.
Reg. 19528 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). The final regulations
were amended to require the reporting of only 33 metrics. 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425); see Pioneer ACO Model, supra note 84.
131
Partners Healthcare is a non-profit healthcare system that is a teaching affiliate
of Harvard Medical School and provides physician services at Brigham and Women’s
Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital, and other hospitals in and around the Boston area.
See About Partners HealthCare, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, http://www.partners.org/
About/Default.aspx?id=1 (last visited June 30, 2014); Jessica Zigmond, CMS Names ACOs
Leaving Pioneer Program, MODERN HEALTHCARE (July 16, 2013), http://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/20130716/NEWS/307169945/cms-names-acos-leaving-pioneerprogram.
132
Joanne Silberner, Head of Major HMO Sees Openings for Accountable Care
Organizations—The KHN Interview, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 25, 2011), http://kaiser
healthnews.org/news/halvorson-q-and-a-kaiser-permanente-accountable-care-organizations/.
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the part of Medicare beneficiaries, “Since Medicare’s accountable care
program does not require patients to actively select an ACO—or even, once
enrolled, seek care from that ACO—Intermountain is instead developing
what officials call a shared accountability organization.”133 In the formation
of its own accountable care focused organization, Intermountain seems to be
retaining the goals of the Triple Aim, as Intermountain states that the
approach of the shared accountability organization is to provide better care,
better health, and better care management.134
As the data from Leavitt Partners has demonstrated, Intermountain
Health is not alone in its attempts to accomplish some reforms in the system
outside the structure of the ACO.135 Due to dissatisfaction with the
regulations, a lack of confidence or success in the MSSP program, or for
various other reasons, many providers are opting to form their own ACO-like
organizations intended to accomplish similar goals.136 In fact, of the 626
entities Leavitt Partners identified as practicing accountable care, 210 of
those entities were not participating in any sort of government program.137
The Mayo Clinic is one such organization that is trying alternative system
reform models. The Mayo Clinic has formed the Mayo Clinic Care Network,
which it describes as:
[A] network of like-minded organizations which share a
common commitment to improving the delivery of health
care in their communities through high-quality, data-driven,
evidence-based medical care. The network recognizes that
people prefer to get their health care close to home. The
main goal of the network is to help people gain the benefits
of Mayo Clinic expertise without having to travel to a Mayo
Clinic facility.138
The “network” essentially supplies providers otherwise unaffiliated
with the Mayo Clinic with access to physicians from the Mayo Clinic for
consultations, protocols, and other tools and expertise (primarily electronic)
133

Evans, Beyond ACOs, supra note 28. Some key features of Intermountain’s
accountability organization involved placing up to 25% of doctors’ compensation at risk for
performance on quality and cost targets and incorporating the use of shared decision-making
and benefit design that would hold patients accountable for their care. Id.
134
See Shared Accountability, INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, http://intermountain
healthcare.org/about/overview/trustees/for-trustees/healthcare-initiatives/shared-accountability
/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
135
See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 6.
136
Id.
137
See Matthew Petersen et al., Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care
Organizations: August 2013 Update, CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE INTELLIGENCE (2014),
available at http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/advocacy/aco/aco_growth_dispersion.pdf.
138
See Mayo Clinic Care Network, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org
/about-mayo-clinic/care-network (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
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and periodic monitoring from a Mayo Clinic physician.139 Providers
participating in this program can utilize the Mayo Clinic Care Network name
for purposes of marketing in exchange for a fee that paid to the Mayo Clinic
for the services and use of the name.140 While the network hospitals do not
have any joint ownership or joint contracting at this point, features and
programs in the network, especially the use of electronic systems and shared
data, may enable the network, in the future, to financially integrate in a more
formal manner that could provide care for patients in a similar manner across
the country.141 Despite the goal of the ACA to organize large numbers of
providers into similar organizations, what has evolved is a system in which
providers, suppliers, and insurers are continuing to explore various
healthcare delivery systems (with some common themes to ACOs) on a
contract by contract basis for certain discrete services.142 Similarly, AMCs
and integrated delivery systems like the Mayo Clinic are opting out of ACOs
entirely, and instead are charting their own paths towards the provision of
accountable care outside the MSSP context.143
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF ACOS UNDER THE ACA?
If ACOs were intended to serve as the mechanism by which the U.S.
healthcare system could realize, or at least move closer towards, the Triple
Aim, and those institutions that were thought to be role models in that
movement are not participating as ACOs, what does that mean for purposes
139

Id.
Id.
141
One of the biggest challenges under the current healthcare system with forming
a multistate system that would be truly integrated from a financial perspective relates to the
system of reimbursement. Due to various insurance regulations and the structure of health
insurance reimbursement, negotiating payor contracts that could apply to various entities that
are located in various states across the country could be challenging. For example, the Blue
Cross Blue Shield systems have a sort of national umbrella organization, but there are 37
insurance companies that are incorporated in various states and negotiate contracts with
providers in those specific states. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, www.bcbs.com (last visited Oct.
21, 2014).
142
See David Muhlestein et al., Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives,
LEAVITT PARTNERS (Dec. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO
Covered Lives], http://leavittpartners.com/2013/12/geographic-distribution-of-aco-coveredlives/.
143
In addition to larger academic medical centers and large integrated delivery
systems, many rural hospitals found themselves opting out of participation in ACOs. Justin
Kearns, Rural Roads to ACOs: Inter-Community Collaboration is Key to Rural Accountable
Care Organizations’ Success Under Medicare Shared Savings Program, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
425 (2013). In response to the preliminary regulations for ACOs, CMS made many
adjustments that were intended to assist rural providers in being able to meet necessary
hurdles for purposes of participating in the MSSP. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.404. For example,
federally qualified health centers (“FQHCs”) and rural health clinics (“RHCs”) were permitted
to form independent ACOs. Id. Additionally, there are exceptions for rurally-based ACOs in
connection with the antitrust safety zones that would excuse rural ACOs from the 30% market
share limits. Id.
140
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of the success of ACOs fulfilling their goals and purposes? Are ACOs, as
structured under the ACA, able to provide that success for all kinds and type
of providers across the country, including leaders in healthcare like the Mayo
Clinic? Do AMCs and other integrated delivery systems need to participate
in the MSSP and/or Pioneer ACO Program to realize the Triple Aim?
A. ACO Successes
In order to answer the above questions, it first seems necessary to
consider how current ACOs are faring and analyze their successes and
challenges. The phrase “accountable care organization” first made its
appearance into healthcare vernacular in 2007, and has since exploded into
the industry due to the use of these ACOs under the MSSP.144 Industry
experts have defined the generic concept of an ACO as an entity that consists
of “providers who are jointly held accountable for achieving measured
quality improvements and reductions in the rate of spending growth.”145 As
noted above, there are likely far more organizations that are practicing
accountable care or functioning as accountable care organizations, but the
term ACO and entities utilizing the ACO moniker are most predominantly
entities participating in the MSSP.146 Initial indications from ACOs under the
MSSP are that many entities participating in the program have been

144

See generally Fisher, supra note 76.
Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care Into
Practice, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 982 (2010), available at http://content.healthaffairs.
org/content/29/5/982.full.
146
See Muhlestein, The Accountable Care Paradigm, supra note 13, at 4.
Muhlestein and his colleagues conducted a study of accountable care organizations in an effort
to compare such organizations to HMOs to understand the distinctions and similarities
between the two entity types. In defining which entities were included as part of the study, the
authors did not limit their study group to those entities that are participating in the MSSP.
Rather, Muhlestein noted:
In any effort to define accountable care, a distinction must be drawn
between the accountable care movement and Medicare Shared Savings
Program (MSSP). An MSSP ACO is a payment model established by
statute and regulation with a defined structure and specific objectives. The
MSSP, however, is only one model of accountable care. Due to the intense
focus on MSSP ACOs, many definitions are limited to explanations of the
MSSP, but this is insufficient to define the movement as a whole given the
intense activity occurring by non-Medicare players, including private and
state-level Medicaid efforts.
Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted). As mentioned above, the intention of this Article is to
focus on the specific provisions of the ACA to determine whether the existing structure as
drafted in the ACA will enable the industry to function in fulfillment of the goals of the Triple
Aim. Therefore, ACOs are examined through the lens and definition set forth under the ACA,
although the authors acknowledge that there are many organizations that are practicing
accountable care in different manners.
145
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successful in cost savings and quality improvements.147 In examining
preliminary data from the Medicare ACOs and the Pioneer ACOs, HHS
reported that savings from both programs in 2014 generated over $372
million in total savings for the Medicare program, and generated shared
savings payments of $445 million.148 HHS reported that ACOs in their
second performance year improved on quality scores and patient experience
measures.149 This comes on the heels of reports that were released in the
middle of 2014, stating that in the MSSP program over the first 12 months
“…nearly half (54 out of 114) of the ACOs that started the program
operations in 2012 already had lower expenditures than projected. Of the 54
ACOs that exceed their benchmarks in the first 12 months, 29 generated
savings totaling more than $126 million ….”150 The Pioneer ACO program
has also demonstrated high quality scores, with a mean quality score of
85.2% and an estimated total savings of over $96 million with shared savings
payments of $68 million.151
Although there have been some successes, there have also been some
growing pains. In the two years since the program’s beginning, nine of the
Pioneer ACOs dropped out of the program in the first year152 and an
additional four dropped out of the Program in the second year, leaving the
grand total of participants at 19.153 Granted, the ACO numbers from the
MSSP (and to some extent the Pioneer ACOs) are still preliminary and the
program is in its infancy, there are at least preliminary indications that
entities participating in the program are achieving savings and are
performing well on quality metrics.154
147

Medicare’s Delivery System Reform Initiatives Achieve Significant Savings and
Quality Improvements—Off to a Strong Start, HHS.GOV (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/01/20140130a.html.
148
See Facts Sheets: Medicare ACOs Continue to Succeed in Improving Care,
Lowering Cost Growth, CMS.GOV (Sept. 16, 2014) [hereinafter CMS, Facts Sheets],
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheetsitems/2014-09-16.html.
149
Id.
150
See Medicare’s Delivery Reform Initiatives, supra note 147.
151
See CMS, Facts Sheets, supra note 148.
152
Molly Gamble and Heather Punke, 100 Accountable Care Organizations to
Know, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com
/lists/100-accountable-care-organizations-to-know.html. It should be noted that seven of the
nine that dropped out Pioneer ACO Program transitioned into the MSSP. Id.
153
Melanie Evans, Medicare’s Pioneer Program Down to 19 ACOs after Three
More Exit, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Evans, Medicare’s Pioneer
Program Down to 19 ACOs], http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140925/
NEWS/309259938&utm_source=AltURL&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=am&Allow
View=VXQ0UnpwZTVBL2FiL1IzSkUvSHRlRU9nalVrZEErVlY=?mh.
154
Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 425 subd. F. Note that under the MSSP, achieving
quality goals is built into the payment structure such that an entity that is not performing well
on quality metrics will not achieve a maximum level of savings. Prior to the payment of any
savings under the program, CMS assesses a score for the ACO on the established 33 quality
metrics. The percentage of “success” on quality metrics is applied to the savings. For example,
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In fact, there are three systems in the Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Minnesota area that are participating in the MSSP and one of the systems,
Allina Health, performed the best overall on diabetes measures according to
data released by CMS regarding five of the 33 measures upon which CMS
reported in the beginning of 2014.155 Reporting of the metrics, however, has
been one of the biggest challenges for the program.156 Although the reporting
of public data from CMS has been somewhat limited, those reporting the
data have stated that the process of reporting the data to CMS has
“accelerated improvement efforts and strengthened care, most notably in
areas not previously tracked by providers and in areas of weak
performance.”157 Although Allina Health stated on its website that it did not
earn any shared savings for the first quarter,158 others have found that, at
least according to the results that have been reported publicly by CMS, there
appears to be a correlation between strong quality performance and cost
savings.159 While the reporting requirements, and the lack of publicly
available information, have been criticized, it does seem that the
requirements to begin the process of tracking and reporting these quality
metrics has made systems and hospitals more aware of where their attention
needs to be focused in terms of quality.160
While ACOs are on the rise and appear to be making an impact on
the market, at least as related to savings, the percentage of ACO covered
lives remains low relative to total population.161 As of December 23, 2013,
if the entity scores 100% on the quality metrics, the ACO may be paid the entirety of the
savings that are owed to the ACO based on the formula set forth in the ACO. If the entity
instead scores only 40% on the quality metrics, the entity could only be paid 40% of the
available savings that are owed to the ACO based on the same formula.
155
See Jordan Rau, Medicare Data Show Wide Differences in ACOs’ Patient
Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org
/Stories/2014/February/21/Medicare-Data-Shows-Wide-Differences-In-ACOs-PatientCare.aspx. Kaiser Health News reported that 88% of Allina Health’s diabetes patients kept
their blood pressure under the target set by Medicare of 140/90 mmHg. Note, however, that it
appears that there were some challenges in gathering and reporting of data. John Muir Health
Medicare ACO in San Francisco scored poorly, as the report stating that only 9% of its
patients had their blood pressure below the rate set by Medicare. John Muir, however, stated a
reporting error in which 534 of the 616 patients did not have blood pressure readings due to a
computing error. John Muir Health Medicare ACO claims that of the 73 patients whose blood
pressure was reported, 71% met the Medicare rate. Id.
156
Melanie Evans, Limited Medicare ACO Quality Data Show Sharp Variation in
Performance, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 3, 2014) [hereinafter Evans, Limited Medicare
ACO Quality Data], http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140503/MAGAZINE/3050
39990 (noting that “CMS has released results for only five of 22 quality measures it has
responsibility for publishing.”).
157
Id.
158
See Medicare Accountable Care Organization (ACO), ALLINA HEALTH,
http://www.allinahealth.org/ahs/medicalservices.nsf/page/aco (last visited June 30, 2014).
159
See Evans, Limited Medicare ACO Quality Data, supra note 156.
160
See id.
161
See Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note
142, at 3–4.
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CMS reported that there were a total of 366 ACOs participating in either the
MSSP or the Pioneer ACO program.162 Leavitt Partners published a study
last updated in June, 2014 in which it examined 626 entities that it
considered to be ACOs,163 consisting of 329 entities that had government
contracts (and are thus participating in either the MSSP or the Pioneer ACO
program), 210 entities had commercial contracts, and 74 entities that had
both kinds of contracts.164 Due to the establishment of ACOs in the ACA,
Leavitt Partners reported that at least some ACO activity is seen to some
degree in all 50 states.165 While activity is increasing, and is seen nationwide,
the percentage of ACO covered lives remains relatively low, with a
penetration of between just three and 10% of total covered lives in most
states.166 There are two states that have reported greater than 15% of their
covered lives in the state are participating in ACOs, with Oregon reporting
the highest rate at 25%.167 The study concluded that, based on current trends
and penetration, the best chance for success of ACOs is in markets (a) that
already have a strong history of managed care (such as the Geisinger Health
System in Pennsylvania, the Kaiser Permanente system in California, and the
162

More Partnerships Between Doctors and Hospitals Strengthen Coordinated
Care for Medicare Beneficiaries, CMS.GOV (Dec. 23, 2013) [hereinafter CMS Press Release,
More Partnerships], http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/
2013-Press-releases-items/2013-12-23.html; David Muhlestein, Accountable Care Growth In
2014: A Look Ahead, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Muhlestein,
Accountable Care Growth], http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/29/accountable-care-growthin-2014-a-look-ahead/.
163
Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142, at
1–2 (clarifying that the study tracked entities that are practicing “accountable care” and not
just those entities that are considered ACOs under the MSSP program).
164
Petersen, supra note 137, at 1. The study noted that they are tracking 13 other
ACOs, but such entities have not yet released specific information regarding the activities,
even though they have reported their intentions to “practice accountable care.”); see also
Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142 at 1–2. Since the
date of the published study, CMS published its report regarding the fourth round of MSSP
participants and the third round of Pioneer ACO organizations. Accountable Care
Organization 2014 Program Analysis Quality Performance Standards Narrative Measure
Specifications, CMS.GOV (Aug. 15, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACONarrativeMeasures-Specs.pdf.
165
Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142, at
3. (noting that Alabama does not have an ACO that is headquartered in its state, but there are
residents of the state of Alabama who are participating in ACOs that are headquartered in
other states). Id. at 4; Petersen, supra note 137, at 4.
166
Peterson, supra note 137, at 5.
167
Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142 at
4–5 (arguing that Oregon’s success is due in large part to the fact that Oregon’s Medicaid
Program implemented a system in August of 2012 in which it utilizes Coordinated Care
Organizations (“CCOs”) for delivering care to its Medicaid population). Id. at 4. This program
was implemented with funding from CMS, which provided Oregon with $1.9 billion to
implement the program, which is expected to reduce per capita healthcare spending in its
Medicaid population by two percentage points by 2014. Id. Similar programs are also active in
Colorado and Utah and are being planned in Alabama, Illinois, and Iowa. Id.
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Intermountain Health system in Utah), (b) where there are dominant payors
and/or providers that have already been practicing accountable care (e.g.,
commercial insurers who are already operating pay for performance
programs or gainsharing programs), or (c) where state legislation has
amended its Medicaid program to operate through ACOs or ACO-like
organizations.168
B. ACO Challenges
While there has been some demonstration of success for ACOs,
some challenges remain. In considering whether the ACO structure enables
providers to function more like entities such as the Mayo Clinic, it must be
acknowledged that the Mayo Clinic and others function quite differently
from most healthcare delivery systems across the nation, and the ACO
structure has not accounted for all of those distinctions.169 As Gawande
points out in The Cost Conundrum, the relationship between the physicians
and the other healthcare professionals vis-à-vis the Mayo Clinic is quite
distinct from the relationship between physicians, professionals, and the
hospitals in McAllen, Texas:
The core tenet of the Mayo Clinic is “The needs of the
patient come first”—not the convenience of the doctors, not
their revenues. The doctors and nurses, and even the janitors,
sat in meetings almost weekly, working on ideas to make the
service and the care better, not to get more money out of
patients. I asked [the Chief Executive Officer of the Mayo
Clinic] how the Mayo Clinic made this possible. “It’s not
easy,” he said. But decades ago Mayo recognized that the
first thing it needed to do was eliminate the financial
barriers. It pooled all the money the doctors and the hospital
system received and began paying everyone a salary, so that
the doctors’ goal in patient care couldn’t be increasing their
168

Id. at 4.
Kaiser Permanente is the largest nonprofit health plan in the United States and
is known for its integrated approach to care in that it closely coordinates primary, secondary,
and hospital care. See What Health Systems Can Learn from Kaiser Permanente: An Interview
with Hal Wolf, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights
/health_systems_and_services/what_health_systems_can_learn_from_kaiser_permanente_an_
interview_with_hal_wolf. Kaiser Permanente is the largest nonprofit health plan in the United
States and is known for its integrated approach to care in that it closely coordinates primary,
secondary, and hospital care. All those patients who receive care at Kaiser Permanente are
enrollees of their health plan. This is unlike other systems that accept multiple types of
insurance products. Similarly, Intermountain Healthcare also has an associated health plan and
a connected medical group. See INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, http://intermountain
healthcare.org/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“Intermountain Healthcare in an
internationally recognized, nonprofit system of 22 hospitals, a Medical Group with more than
185 physician clinics, and an affiliated health insurance company, SelectHealth.”).
169
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income. Mayo promoted leaders who focused first on what
was best for patients, and then on how to make this
financially possible.170
While ACOs have incorporated the concept of gainsharing through
the MSSP, which is intended to eliminate some of the financial barriers the
Mayo Clinic CEO was referencing, gainsharing does not generate the same
effect as hospitals employing or contracting with physicians and then paying
the physicians a salary or flat-fee, thus eliminating the incentive for overutilization.171 Implementing structural change such as the structure of the
Mayo Clinic, however, is far easier said than done. 172
The majority of all hospitals in the country have no financial
relationship with physicians on their medical staffs, and little money to
undertake such structural changes that would alter that fact.173 In fact,
according to a recent survey from the American Medical Association
(“AMA”), 60% of physicians work in private practices owned by physicians
(either as owners or employees of the practice), with only 23% working in
practices owned in whole or in part by a hospital or hospital system, and only
slightly over 5% of physicians are employed directly by a hospital or hospital
system.174 The AMA has itself acknowledged that the current manner in
which physicians interact and are engaged with hospitals may prove an issue:
“While some physicians will easily be able to adapt to and engage in
Accountable Care Organizations or other health delivery structures that
emphasize greater integration and care coordination, for others it will prove
more of a challenge.”175
Given the structure of most hospital systems, implementing even a
gainsharing structure (much less an employed or contracted physician
structure) that endeavors to create this alignment presents substantial
170

See Gawande, supra note 24, at 12.
While the number of employed physicians is increasing, a report from the
American Medical Association found that only about 212,000 physicians are employed by
hospitals, which includes a small number of dentists and medical residents. Carol K. Kane &
David W. Emmons, New Data on Physician Practice Arrangements: Private Practice
Remains Strong Despite Shifts Toward Hospital Employment, AM. MED. ASS’N. 2 (2013),
available at http://www.nmms.org/sites/default/files/images/2013_9_23_ama_survey_prp-phy
sician-practice-arrangements.pdf. As of 2012, about 60% of physicians worked in a private
practice as either employees or owners. The fact remains that the many physicians in the
country have medical staff privileges to perform services at hospitals, but all or the majority of
the revenue that they receive for such services is generated from billing payors (including
Medicare and Medicaid) on a fee-for-service basis.
172
See id. at 6.
173
See generally id.
174
Id. Of those individuals who are directly employed by hospitals or hospital
systems, data indicates an increase in primary care physicians, which is done with the
intention of maintaining a strong referral base to the hospital’s specialty physicians. Id. at 8.
The two more often reported employed physicians were internal medicine and family practice
physicians. Id.
175
Kane & Emmons, supra note 171, at 8.
171
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challenges to hospitals.176 IHI has emphasized that improving patient
experience, managing population health, and lowering the per capita cost of
healthcare (achieving the Triple Aim) in many instances may mean
providing less costly care or simply less care.177 For many hospitals,
however, the provision of less costly care or less care in the current
environment is likely to have a large impact on the bottom line that may not
be offset by potential savings to a specified Medicare population.178 Thus,
trying to convince providers to shift the paradigm towards an ACO model
seeking to achieve the Triple Aim is actually a greater task than it would first
appear.
An example of this challenge can be seen in the following scenario:
assume that a patient goes to see an orthopaedic physician due to a wrist
injury. Upon examination, the wrist appears to be broken in two places. The
physician notes that the nature of the break is such that it would likely have a
very successful outcome if the patient has surgery and a metal rod inserted.
Surgery will require admission to the hospital, as the surgery must be done
on an inpatient basis. Alternatively, the break is relatively clean and it is
possible that it will heal nicely on its own with a splint and cast, and proper
monitoring and follow-up. In the current fee-for-service driven system, both
the hospital and the physician will generate the highest revenue if the
physician recommends that the patient have surgery.179 From the patient
perspective, surgery is likely to drive up fees in the form of co-pays, coinsurance, and deductibles, and will likely mean time off work or school.
Attempting to splint and cast the arm first, however, will be more cost
efficient and less invasive for the patient. From a Triple Aim perspective, the
surgical option, unless absolutely warranted from a medical perspective,
potentially fails two “aims” in that it is more costly for the payor and the
patient, and does not provide quality services that are consistent with patient
satisfaction.180 That said, the non-surgical option provides the least amount
176

Id. at 4. See also Susan Kreimer, ACOs: Multi-Year Transition Requires an
Overhaul to Healthcare Delivery, MED. ECON. (June 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.
modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/acos-multi-year-transition-requires-overhaulhealthcare-delivery?page=full; see also Gawande, supra note 24, at 15.
177
See Berwick, supra note 7, at 720.
178
See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2.
179
Both the hospital and the physician will be paid if the physician chooses to
perform surgery (the hospital in the form of the technical fee and the physician in the form of
the professional fee). To the extent that the physician opts for the “wait and see” approach, the
hospital will not bill for any services and the physician will only bill for the associated office
visit.
180
It should be acknowledge that patient satisfaction is often times a subjective
standard. While the splint and cast option will be less costly to the patient and will not involve
a hospital stay, it is possible that a patient would choose the surgical option in order to ensure
that the break is fixed right the first time and it avoids having to sit around and see if the nonsurgical option works. To the extent that the patient ends up having to have surgery regardless,
it is arguable that the patient could claim more satisfaction if the surgical option had been
chosen from the beginning.
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of revenue for the physician and the hospital. If the physician and hospital
are participating in an ACO under the MSSP, choosing the non-surgical
option will be less costly, and may lead to the ability to share in overall
savings, assuming quality metrics are met.181 In making this decision,
however, both the hospital and physician are forced to consider whether the
potential savings that may be achieved will be offset by services provided to
other patients.
Mayo Clinic and other integrated delivery systems have noted the
challenges that are presented by a new reality that providing more efficient
care might mean providing less care in connection with their hesitancy in
participating in the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program, which reality has been
echoed by hospitals that are currently participating in ACOs.182 As the
example above demonstrates, the paradigm shift away from fee-for-service
reimbursement towards efficient and more cost-effective care also moves the
focus away from a hospital’s average daily census, which has been the
historical bellwether for hospitals in ensuring sufficient revenues.183
Margaret O’Kane, President of the National Committee for Quality
Assurance explained:
Learning to function “180 degrees differently” will require a
lot of innovation in a leaner environment. . . . “The business
incentive for a hospital usually is to have heads in beds, and
if you’re an ACO, you’re trying to keep people out of the
hospital and healthy[.] It could take down the whole
organization if your hospital beds are empty, so it’s a
complicated transition for a hospital.”184
One provider that seems to have guarded against this is MissionPoint
Health Partners in Nashville, Tennessee, for which the ACO is currently only
available for employees of Saint Thomas Health, and for which health
insurance is self-funded.185 St. Thomas Health was successful in decreasing
overall costs from 2012 to 2013, some of which was attributed to savings
through a reduction in admissions to the hospital and emergency room

181

See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 1.
Gold, supra note 126; see Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2 (noting that hospitalbased ACOs are experiencing more challenges and difficulties than provider-based ACOs).
183
Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2. An “average daily census” is defined as the “The
average number of inpatients present each day for a given time period. This figure is derived
by dividing the sum of patient days for a period by the number of days in the same period.”
Education Module for Health Record Practice, available at http://www.unc.
edu/~murrell/Health_Care_Statistics_class/Health_Care_Statistics.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2015).
184
Id. Kreimer, supra note 176.
185
See generally MISSION POINT, http://www.missionpointhealth.org/about/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2014).
182
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visits.186 Such reductions in a fee-for-service system necessarily means less
revenue for the hospital related to such services. In the case of St. Thomas
Health, however, reduction of those volumes was offset by cost savings
realized through its employees’ healthcare expenses.187 While successful for
St. Thomas Health and MissionPoint Health Partners, not all hospitals can
experience these same savings on the employee side to offset losses in
revenue on the hospital-side.
C. Does the Current ACO Structure Fulfill the Triple Aim?
It appears, then, that there is conflicting information about whether
or not ACOs can be successful as a means for fulfilling the Triple Aim.
Based on preliminary data, ACOs that seem to function well, or are at least
able to generate some savings and meet quality standards in the MSSP, are
located in urban settings and consist of large multi-specialty groups of
providers that do not have a heavy focus on research or teaching, and were
not previously operating in an integrated system.188 Perhaps some of the
successes are due to the fact that these organizations likely could have
practiced better care coordination and realized efficiencies years earlier, but
were not willing to attempt such changes without financial incentives.189
Perhaps this is because larger systems involved in research and teaching have
been sustaining their operations through margins realized on reimbursement
from commercial payors, but such systems are not (yet) able to achieve any
savings on Medicare patients, despite providing efficient and effective
care.190
Regardless of the reason behind it, the fact that success under the
MSSP, a key part of the United States healthcare industry, especially for
AMCs and other integrated delivery systems, remains elusive indicates that
the ACO scheme currently established under regulations does not appear to
be achieving the Triple Aim. Evidence supports a finding that the current
ACO structure may improve patient experience of care, the health of certain
Medicare beneficiaries, and may reduce the per capita cost of healthcare for
the Medicare program and certain of its beneficiaries. Such a structure does
not, however, enable successes at the country’s top AMCs. Absent such
186

Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2–3.
Id.
188
Id. at 2.
189
One of the reasons provided by ACOs that dropped out of the Pioneer ACO
Program for departure from the program was that fact that the systems were already operating
at maximum efficiencies, and thus, achievement of additional savings were likely elusive
because of an inability to reduce additional expenses. Debra Ness &William Kramer, The
First-Year Pioneer ACO Results: Predictable Bumps in the Road, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July 25,
2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/07/25/the-first-year-pioneer-aco-results-predictablebumps-in-the-road/.
190
See supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo Clinic
and its Mayo Clinic Care Network).
187
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inclusion, the ACO structure is unable to achieve the equity balance that is so
critical to the Triple Aim.191
If the U.S. is to realize the goals of the ACA through adoption of the
Triple Aim, legislators and regulators must adapt the current ACO
regulations in a way that will encourage participation of AMCs in ACOs and
associated care delivery models. A system in which AMCs are unable or
unwilling to participate in ACOs is likely to result in one of two
eventualities: (1) AMCs will be squeezed out of any new service delivery
models, such as ACOs, potentially reducing or eliminating institutions that
are leading the country in innovation, teaching, efficiency, and quality; or (2)
ACOs and other evolving healthcare delivery models will falter because
industry leaders, such as the Mayo Clinic, are not participating in the reform
movement, which will result in maintenance of the status quo of healthcare
in the United States. A U.S. healthcare system without providers such as the
Mayo Clinic would lack in innovation, cutting-edge research, and
meaningful advancement of evidenced-based research.192 These losses would
fail to attain the goals of the Triple Aim of achieving better patient care and
better population health in furtherance of the Triple Aim193 How does the
healthcare industry avoid this eventuality without putting the country in a
situation where, either, providers simply opt out of providing services to
government beneficiaries entirely or AMCs cease to exist as they are known
today, along with some of the care they provide?
D. Recommendations
Marc Bard was correct to say that it really is not enough for purposes
of actually reforming the healthcare delivery system in the United States if,
at the end of the day, the only result is that the entities that were performing

191

See generally Berwick, supra note 7, at 760.
Regulations that also encourage support of rural providers is also essential in
the system, as assuring access to care in local communities that provides convenience and
accessibility for patients in rural settings is equally essential for ensuring that healthcare that is
available to all segments of the population. For purposes of this article, the focus will be on
the importance of AMCs in the system, but rural providers are also a critical provider that has
thus far struggled with participating in ACOs. Beth Kutscher, Nine Rural Providers Test Out
ACO Initiative, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Jan. 28, 2014) http://www.modernhealth
care.com/article/20140128/NEWS/301289912#; see DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM AND RURAL PROVIDERS (2014), available at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/
Downloads/ACO_Rural_Factsheet_ICN907408.pdf; see also A. CLINTON MACKINNEY ET. AL.,
RUPRI CTR. FOR RURAL HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN
RURAL AMERICA (2013) available at http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/
2013/Accountable%20Care%20Organizations%20in%20Rural%20America.pdf; A. Clinton
MacKinney et. al., The March to Accountable Care Organizations—How Will Rural Fare?, J.
RURAL HEALTH 131 (2011).
193
Id.
192
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at maximum efficiency continue to perform at maximum efficiency. 194
Further, if the U.S. healthcare delivery system is to achieve the Triple Aim,
which this article argues is a desired and perhaps necessary goal in order to
truly reform the way in which healthcare is delivered in the U.S., it is not
enough that a few large urban providers afford greater integrative care for a
percentage of the U.S.’s Medicare beneficiaries.195 Underlying all of the
insurance reform, coverage mandates, and quality metrics in the ACA is the
concept that what the ACA is attempting to accomplish is better care for
patients, better health for our communities, and lower costs through
improvement for our healthcare system.196 While the current ACO structure
is a step in the right direction towards trying to accomplish all of those goals,
it seems to be falling short of such goals in its current state. Although some
ACOs may be providing “better care,”197 such care is limited to those
individuals who happen to live in areas in which ACOs are participating,
which in large part seem to be centered in urban areas, many with providers
that were already operating integrated systems.198 Without more widespread
adoption of the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program,199 current ACOs will
continue to provide care to a limited portion of Medicare beneficiaries.200
Additionally, certain providers, such as the Mayo Clinic and Intermountain
Health System, may be unavailable for individuals who cannot afford their
services, depending on their insurance coverage.201 Finally, from a cost
containment perspective, while preliminary data indicates that many
providers participating in the ACO program have been able to achieve
savings in the first few years of the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program, as the
case may be,202 such savings appear limited to only a small portion of urban,
multispecialty groups that needed financial incentives to realize efficiencies
that perhaps could have been achieved years earlier.203 Thus, in considering
194

Molly Gamble, ACOs: The Least Agreed-Upon Concept in Healthcare?
Becker’s Hosp. Rev. (May 6, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/accountable-careorganizations/acos-the-least-agreed-upon-concept-in-healthcare.html.
195
See generally Berwick, supra note 7.
196
See CMS Innovation Center, supra note 16.
197
See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2.
198
See Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note
142, at 3–4.
199
Indeed, there are systems that are providing “accountable care” even if not
participating in ACOs through the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program. This article argues,
however, that without more widespread adoption of ACOs through a national program like
Medicare that the delivery systems that are providing care across the U.S. will continue to do
so in a disjointed and uncoordinated manner, just as the system is currently functioning. Thus,
participation in these programs is essential for trying to establish some uniformity for how
accountable care is delivered across populations.
200
See generally Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives,
supra note 142; see also Petersen, supra note 137.
201
See generally Nelson, supra note 94.
202
See Medicare’s Delivery Reform Initiatives, supra note 147; see also CMS,
Facts Sheets, supra note 148.
203
See Kreimer, supra note 176, at 2–3.
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aspects of the Triple Aim: (a) achieving better health for our communities
remains elusive to the extent that the same quality and level of care varies
based on where one lives or where one seeks care; and (b) providing better
population health at a lower cost per patient also proves challenging because
for those entities, like the Mayo Clinic, that do not or cannot generate
revenues based on Medicare reimbursement, even if costs can be lowered for
some Medicare beneficiaries, costs cannot be lowered for all patients.204
These challenges should not be taken to suggest that the ACO
concept or structure needs to be scrapped entirely. It seems clear that, despite
certain reservations with the ACO regulations, the MSSP, and Pioneer ACO
Programs, providers in the United States are largely in agreement that the
United States does need to reform the healthcare delivery system in a way
that provides for more integrated and more coordinated care.205 Given
growing support for the concept of accountable care, despite somewhat
slowly evolving participation in the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program,206 it
seems that the best hope for achieving the Triple Aim and working towards
those goals envisioned with enactment of the ACA, is to work towards
revising the ACO structure in such a way that all providers, especially
AMCs, but also rural hospitals as well as those systems that are already
finding some successes in the current programs, can participate.207 This
article proposes three primary changes to the ACO structure that, ideally,
will adequately encourage participation by a wider percentage of providers,
including leaders in quality and effective care like the Mayo Clinic.
First, the ACO structure needs to include comprehensive payment
reform that eliminates, or greatly reduces, reliance on a fee-for-service
structure. Granted, there are ongoing pilot projects testing various payment
204

105.

See generally Nelson, supra note 94; see also Mayo’s Dominance, supra note

205
As pointed out in the Leavitt study regarding ACO penetration discussed in
Part IV above, there are a number of providers that are participating in organizations
providing accountable care, even if such organizations are not participating in any Medicare
programs. See Muhlestein, Geographic Distribution of ACO Covered Lives, supra note 142, at
2. Clinically integrated networks have becomes increasingly common both among providers
and among providers in combination with insurers. Jason Goldwater et. al., Considerations for
Clinical Integration, TRUVEN HEALTH ANALYTICS 4 (2011), available at http://truven
health.com/portals/0/assets/HOSP_11363_0712_ClinicalIntegration_WP_Web_7662; see also
Why Should You Clinically Integrate?, THE CAMDEN GROUP (2014) http://www.thecam
dengroup.com/thought-leadership/blog/why-should-you-clinically-integrate/ (last visited Jan.
27, 2015). Not wanting to be left behind, many physicians are joining these organizations or
participating in certain insurance networks or becoming employees of hospital systems due to
the belief (or, for many, fear) that the healthcare delivery system will move in a direction of
more integrated and coordinated care away from a fee-for-service model. Abby Goodnough,
New Law’s Demands on Doctors Have Many Seeking a Network, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014),
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systems,208 but the MSSP and Pioneer ACO program that promotes
gainsharing while retaining a fee-for-service payment system will be unable
to evolve to a point where other providers are encouraged to enter.209 If such
a lack of participation continues for too long, the ACO structure will wither
and die before any payment reforms can be implemented. In examining why
systems like the Mayo Clinic have been successful with providing more
efficient care, observers (and even the Mayo Clinic itself) credit this success,
in part, to the compensation structure of the Mayo Clinic’s physicians.210
Unlike private practice physicians who are compensated only when they
perform services, the physicians at Mayo Clinic have no pressure or need to
ensure a certain volume of patients or number of procedures in order to
sustain a practice or make a living.211
While gainsharing programs such as the MSSP provide some
physician-hospital alignment, such programs are not sustainable on a long
term basis as the sole means assuring integration and coordination.212 This is
true for three primary reasons: (a) at some point, the physicians and hospital
will be operating at maximum efficiency and further savings and incentives
will be impossible without the potential for impacting patient care;213 (b)
shared savings programs like the MSSP alone do not address or control the
actions of the physicians outside of the hospital setting, which may be used
to offset losses in fee-for-service revenues at the hospital;214 and (c) if
hospitals are realizing success in meeting quality metrics and lowering costs
through gainsharing, such success likely means fewer patients who are
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seeking services at the hospital,215 which means less revenue based on the
current payment system.216 To the extent that the Medicare system continues
to lack comprehensive payment reform, such as bundled payments or valuebased purchasing, which should be implemented in conjunction with shared
savings incentives, it will be challenging to reform the current system in a
way that actually emulates the quality and efficiency that is demonstrated by
providers like the Mayo Clinic.
Granted, there are ongoing pilot programs for many payment reform
mechanisms217 and it is important to take the time to ensure that whatever
payment system is implemented in the future will be successful in
accomplishing desired goals. It is critical to keep these payment reform
initiatives a top priority, however, because achieving the goals of the Triple
Aim and experiencing true cost containment for all populations is unlikely to
occur so long as the fee-for-service system is still in place.218 So long as the
fee-for-service system remains, many providers, including a disproportionate
number of AMCs and other integrated delivery systems, will be either unable
or unwilling to participate in the MSSP or Pioneer ACO Program on the
basis that achieving savings under these programs, based on their costs in
providing services, is exceedingly challenging.219 Without wider adoption of
the MSSP and Pioneer ACO Programs by AMCs and similar research
institutions, the balance that Berwick avers is so critical for pursuit of the
Triple Aim is unachievable, because the healthcare system will remain
fractured as providers pursue their own paths towards healthcare reform
without coordination and cooperation.220 A system in which various
providers are pursuing their own goals and aims is not unlike the system that
215
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was in effect in the United States prior to adoption of the ACA. That is, the
Mayo Clinic, Kaiser Permanente, Intermountain Health and other similar
systems have been pursuing alternative delivery systems and coordination of
care for years, but without comprehensive payment reform that has forced
other providers to consider modeling these systems, the systems have
remained silos in their respective areas with little impact on changing the
way that other systems function.221
The second recommendation for amendments to the ACO structure
is to consider carefully the establishment of the metrics and tracking of
outcomes data in connection with ACOs and the manner in which such
quality markers are utilized for purposes of reimbursement.222 In examining
the Mayo Clinic, even with its successes regarding patient outcomes and
efficient care delivery (as demonstrated by lower than average Medicare
spending), it has also been clear that supporting the quality of care that is
provided at the Mayo Clinic cannot be sustained by the Mayo Clinic or other
providers based on the current Medicare payment structure.223 As leadership
at the Mayo Clinic has recognized, as well as other leaders of AMCs, the
quality care received at the Mayo Clinic is attainable because the Mayo
Clinic and other AMCs are innovators in their respective fields and conduct a
large amount of research that ensures that some of the sickest patients are
receiving care supported by evidenced-based medicine.224 The research and
innovation that takes place at AMCs across the country is not inexpensive
and cannot be fully sustained based on Medicare’s current reimbursement
system, or even such reimbursement system in combination with shared
savings.225 It is not in furtherance of the Triple Aim, however, to continue a
system in which such research and innovation is only sustainable to the
extent that commercial insurers continue to pay more than government
payors to a group of select providers.226
In addition to the challenges of funding related to research and
innovation, the current ACO structure does not recognize distinctions in
221
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patient population for purposes of its shared savings.227 AMCs, as specialty
institutions, tend to have more complex patients with multiple comorbidities.228 As a result, keeping these patients out of the hospital and
complying with some of the 33 quality metrics may be more challenging
given that the patients are not being treated for only one condition.229 The
incentives and payment structure of the current ACO system provides for
exceedingly limited exceptions or allowances for these factors that are
unique to AMCs.230 Therefore, as providers consider establishing an ACO
and those other entities with which they would want to associate, AMCs are
not necessarily an attractive partner, as it is possible that such association
will actually hinder the ability to achieve shared savings and desired quality
scores.231 Such issues are especially inherent at an AMC because of the high
expense structure at AMCs due to the teaching and training aspects of these
institutions,232 which cannot simply be reduced to the same extent that a
hospital could save costs related to better coordination of supply chain
management, for example.233
In order to address this issue, the ACO structure needs to be adapted
to account for or allow for some of the inherent challenges of working with
AMCs. Some of these adjustments can be remedied through payment reform
that eliminates the fee-for-service payment and provides for compensation
that is paid across a continuum, encouraging transfer for specialty services as
227
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soon as possible, or in the alternative, transfer from a specialty hospital to a
lower level of care.234 Current fee-for-service structure, despite the
possibility of shared savings, retains challenges for hospitals in maintaining
revenues based on lower volumes. Elimination of fee-for-service will shift
the focus away from the issues related to ensuring a sufficient volume.235
Additionally, and in the interim, the quality metrics need to be weighted or
adjusted based on the condition of the patient similar to other systems. While
classifying how “sick” a patient is can be challenging, the quality metrics
need to be fluid and flexible enough to have at least some allowances for comorbidities or patients who are at a higher complexity, and thus cannot be
compared from an outcomes perspective with healthier patients. Allowing
this flexibility will provide a greater likelihood of the possibility of shared
savings in the current system, despite some variance in outcomes data.
Maintaining a structure that promotes inclusion of AMCs in ACOs might
enable the costs of teaching and research to be better spread across a
multitude of providers, ultimately enabling systems to work together to
reduce costs as a whole. This coordination should result in a structure that
more closely resembles the Triple Aim, as it means better care for patients
and a population across a continuum in settings that should be the most cost
effective based on patient needs. Such coordination will not take place,
however, unless AMCs are seen as assets and contributors to the ACO
structure, as opposed to hindrances.
Finally, although perhaps the most challenging politically, ACOs
need to more fully incorporate the concepts promoted by Intermountain
Health System and others;236 namely, Medicare beneficiaries and commercial
beneficiaries alike need to be participants in their care in a way that makes
both providers and patients accountable for a patient’s care.237 One of the
reasons that HMOs were successful from a cost containment perspective in
the 1970s and 1980s related to the fact that beneficiaries were limited in their
movement among providers.238 Cost containment proved successful to the
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extent that insurers could require patients to seek care from specific
providers with whom the insurer had already negotiated low rates.239 While a
lack of flexibility in this area ultimately became one of the key downfalls of
HMOs long-term, completely ignoring the fact that some level of patient
involvement and accountability is necessary for cost containment and
coordination of care disregards some of the lessons that should have been
learned from the managed care movement. Indeed, one of the biggest
criticisms of the current ACO structure is that it is challenging for providers
to control costs if beneficiaries are permitted to seek care from other
providers outside an established network as well as within the network.240
From the perspective of the Triple Aim, Berwick himself has
promoted the flexibility of Medicare beneficiaries to seek care from any
provider as an aspect of ACOs that is in furtherance of the Triple Aim
because it enhances the care experience.241 Berwick has stated in recent
interviews:
[A]bout 1 in 4 Medicare beneficiaries chooses to be in a
private health plan through Medicare Advantage, also
known as Part C Medicare. They accept the restrictions on
choice of provider in return for better-coordinated care. . . .
Seventy-five percent of Medicare beneficiaries don’t want
restricted choices. Do they have to forgo the benefits of good
managed care? Many experts would say, “Yes.” They think
that care management is incompatible with patient choice.
The ACO premise is different. Beneficiaries don’t join an
ACO; providers of care do. . . . It will work because it is set
up to reward the right combination of goals for our time:
transparency, coordination, consumer power and intolerance
of waste.242
In contrast, Jeff Goldsmith stated in response, “The biggest problem
with the ACO, however, isn’t the faulty business proposition, but the
patient’s role. . . . Patients need to be active agents in their own health, and in
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an effective care system. They need to choose to participate and be rewarded
for healthy behavior.”243
Granted, Berwick’s caution in this area is well-placed in that creating
an ACO system that ignores some of the key components of HMOs that
ultimately gave rise to the failure of such HMOs would simply be repeating
history. That said, does the current system that enables patients to receive
care from any provider, even though the providers themselves are restricted
in terms of their patients, truly achieve the Triple Aim? Can you still achieve
the aim of patient experience if ultimately the patient ends up receiving (and
paying for) the same test three times due to a lack of coordination among the
patient’s various providers, for example? Recall the dilemma discussed
earlier involving the patient who has a broken wrist.244 Suppose that the
physician does in fact recommend splinting and casting the arm to see if it
heals on its own, in lieu of surgery. Suppose also, however, that the patient is
busy and does not want to have to be in a splint and then cast for the next
eight weeks because the patient is planning on taking a trip to the beach in
five weeks. Under the current MSSP and Pioneer ACO Program, the patient
is permitted to seek care from another provider, who may decide to perform
the surgery. If the plurality of the care is still provided by the original
physician who recommended the splint and case, the physician’s ACO will
still be assessed the cost of the surgery and related expenses for purpose of
its shared savings calculation, even though such costs were not incurred at
the recommendation of the original physician.245 Thus, physicians within an
ACO have greater difficulty in providing the kind of efficient and
accountable care for which such physicians will be judged, on the basis that
the ACO physicians cannot prevent the beneficiary from seeking care outside
the ACO.246 To the extent that the patient is prohibited from going to the
other physician without first discussing it with his first physician, might that
force (even if initially uncomfortable) a conversation between the patient and
physician where the patient talks about the trip to the beach and what the
alternatives might be? It could be argued that the latter scenario will provide
the patient with ultimately increased patient experience because the patient
will feel involved and a part of the care process and decision, and ultimately
(ideally) feel fulfilled about the medical decision that the patient and
physician arrived at collectively.
It seems that it is necessary to arrive at some sort of middle ground
with respect to the role of the patient within the ACO structure that more
meaningfully incorporates the involvement and accountability of the patient,
without restricting care in a way that does not fulfill the Triple Aim.247
Interestingly, there has already been evidence of the resurgence of the
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narrow network as insurance products have rolled out onto the various
exchanges across the country.248 Insurers, unsure about the potential costs of
newly insured individuals whom the insurance companies are now unable to
rate in advance,249 want to create networks that can be tightly held and
controlled with incentives for the providers to provide cost effective and
efficient care as well as disincentives for the patients to seek care outside the
narrow network.250 While these narrow networks have not been viewed
positively by all consumers,251 there are many consumers on the exchanges
who are electing narrow network options because of the lower premiums
associated with these plans.252 As Berwick himself has pointed out, many
consumers abandoned managed care when restrictions that restricted quality
care were hoisted upon them with little choice in the matter and little
flexibility.253 To the extent that Medicare beneficiaries are offered both
choice and incentives, similar to the choice that they can make today to
participate in traditional Medicare or Medicare Advantage, would they be
willing to participate in an ACO structure in which they committed to a
particular set of providers for at least some period of time? Perhaps the
problem with HMOs was not so much the restrictions, but a lack of ability to
choose whether to agree to such restrictions at a lesser cost or based on
certain incentives.
While it is outside the scope of this article to suggest a specific
mechanism for implementing this choice, at a minimum, the ACO
regulations need to incorporate provisions that commit Medicare
beneficiaries to ACOs for some period of time so that the patients can be
more actively engaged participants in their care. To the extent that CMS will
make providers in an ACO responsible for cost containment and will pay
based on outcome-driven data, CMS needs to provide assurances to these
providers that the beneficiaries will work with the providers as participants in
their own care.254 While quality metrics will encourage and incentivize
248
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providers to encourage (and perhaps cajole) their patients to comply with
medication regimens, stop smoking, eat better, etc., to be able to be
successful as to outcomes with those patients and cost containment, the
patient him or herself needs to be included in this process and work with
providers towards those goals.
Although Berwick is cautious about imposing restrictions on
beneficiaries, incorporating some level of patient involvement that commits
the patient to certain providers into the ACO structure would push the ACO
scheme towards the Triple Aim, because it will enable providers to work
more closely with the patient on achieving better care outcomes.
Additionally, so long as the patients feel as if they are choosing to participate
in such coordination, it will also improve the patient experience of care
necessary under the Triple Aim. Likewise, if such a structure is successful, it
should make lowering the per capita cost of healthcare under the ACO
structure more feasible.255
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last four years, many have claimed that, at its heart, the
ACA is simply insurance reform.256 Behind the obvious insurance aspects of
the law, however, the ACA is also attempting to reform the U.S. healthcare
system to move towards providing better patient experience, delivering better
healthcare for the entire population, and lowering the per patient cost of
providing such care257; that is the Triple Aim.258 When this reform movement
began (in fact, when the concept of the Triple Aim was first launched in
2006), the greatest attention and focus rested on integrated systems such as
the Mayo Clinic that were already operating efficiently and effectively.259 In
attempting to recreate or model those structures, the ACA and its enacting
agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, created ACOs,
which are attempting to fulfill this Triple Aim by creating necessary financial
incentives and disincentives that are designed to help hospitals and
physicians work together in a manner that will enable them to function more
like the Mayo Clinic.260 What is clear, however, is that while the ACO
structure is creating alignment for some providers, it remains elusive and
inaccessible for the very providers and systems that it was trying to emulate.
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Such inaccessibility indicates that the ACO structure is not achieving the
goals of the Triple Aim that it set out to accomplish given that it perpetuates
and solidifies the current fractured delivery system.
Rather than a system that seems to be excluding leaders in care
delivery such as the Mayo Clinic, Intermountain Health System, and Kaiser
Permanente, the United States needs such systems to be leading the reform of
the healthcare delivery system. Such leadership cannot exist only in the
commercial sector, but needs to involve the use and participation of
government programs such as Medicare. This is true because not only will
doing so fulfill the balance necessary to achieve the Triple Aim, but also
because government programs are the only programs that cross state borders.
Unlike commercial insurance, which is most often limited to use by residents
in the particular state of incorporation due to licensure laws, nearly every
hospital in the country is a Medicare provider.261 Various systems across the
country are stating that they are practicing accountable care and/or entering
into alternative reimbursement contracts such as shared savings with
insurance companies, even if not part of the MSSP or Pioneer ACO
Program.262 With these sorts of trends, healthcare delivery reform
movements will continue to be fractured and varied unless and until there is a
system within the Medicare program that provides some consistency and is
able to achieve that balance and better health management for an entire
population as envisioned by Berwick and the IHI.263 For this reason, if the
U.S. is to achieve the Triple Aim, focus must be paid to the ACO structure
and to making that structure accessible to all.
In order to create an ACO structure that is accessible and available to
all, the structure must be revised in a way that will assure that it can attract
and include all health systems, including academic medical centers and
integrated delivery systems like the Mayo Clinic. Such reforms may not
come easily, but it is critical to keep the process of development of ACOs
and the ACO structure dynamic. This includes: adoption of more
comprehensive payment reform systems, development and enactment of
national quality standards that are attainable and realistic for all to achieve
and that help spread the related costs of the teaching and research that often
accompany high quality and innovation, and inclusion of Medicare
beneficiaries in their care that will hold such beneficiaries accountable for
their care along with their providers. The Triple Aim is still an attainable
goal, but in order to keep moving towards that goal, much more needs to be
261
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done with respect to the ACO structure that keeps the focus on the Triple
Aim.

